


JANUARY 27 - APRIL 5, 2016



Social Cohesion Analysis: Cameroon

OCTOBER 2016



COVER

Mbororo refugees at a health center in Eastern Cameroon. CRS has projects in health, emergency response and recovery, and partnership and capacity strengthening, as well as a project supporting orphans and vulnerable children. At the time of this analysis, CRS was in the process of starting a project to work in the East of the country, focusing on education, community social services, and social cohesion.

Photo courtesy of Joel Tegua

Report prepared by Laura McGrew

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This report was written by Laura McGrew in consultation with Herman Poukham (CRS/Cameroon ISAP Program Manager for Social Cohesion and Community Mobilization), based on information collected by CRS staff and key partners CDJP and CODASC. Ian Proctor (CRS/CAR Program Manager for Peacebuilding, Governance, and Gender (PBGG)) contributed one section, and the report was edited by Ian Proctor, John Katunga (CRS Peacebuilding and Justice Africa Advisor), Aurelie Nyapeye Yatchou (CRS/Cameroon Capacity Strengthening Advisor), and Laura Groggel (CRS/CARO Regional Technical Advisor for PBGG).

Technical editing: Solveig Bang



Catholic Relief Services is the official international humanitarian agency of the United States Catholic community. CRS' relief and development work is accomplished through programs of emergency response, HIV, health, agriculture, education, microfinance and peacebuilding. CRS eases suffering and provides assistance to people in need in more than 100 countries, without regard to race, religion or nationality.

Copyright © 2016 Catholic Relief Services. Any reproduction, translation, derivation, distribution or other use of this work is prohibited without the express permission of Catholic Relief Services ("CRS"). Please obtain permission from pgpublications@crs.org or write to:

Catholic Relief Services
228 West Lexington Street
Baltimore, MD 21201-3443 USA
1.888.277.7575
www.crs.org

Acronyms

ACADIR	Association Camerounaise pour le Dialogue Interreligieux
AU	African Union
BIR	Brigade Intervention Rapide
CA	Conflict Analysis
CAF	Conflict Assessment Framework
CAR	Central African Republic
CEMAC	Central African Economic and Monetary Community
CDJP	Commission Diocésaine Justice et Paix
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CEPCA	Conseil des Eglises Protestantes du Cameroun
CIDIMUC	Conseil des Imams et Dignitaires Musulmans
CIPP	Central African Republic Interfaith Peacebuilding Partnership
CODASC	Comité Diocésain d'Activités Socio-Caritatives (CODASCaritas)
CPDM	Cameroon People's Democratic Movement
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
DGRE	Direction Générale de la Recherche Extérieure
DPT	diphtheria, tetanus, and pertussis (vaccination)
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EC	European Commission
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS	Economic Community Of West African States
EU	European Union
FGM/C	female genital mutilation/cutting
GBV	gender-based violence
GDP	Gross domestic product
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
GNI	Gross national income
HIV/AIDS	human immunodeficiency virus infection / acquired immune deficiency syndrome
HR	human rights
ICG	International Crisis Group
IDP	internally displaced person
IRP	(CAR) Inter-religious Platform for Peace
KIDSS	Key Interventions to Develop Systems and Services for Orphans and Vulnerable Children
KII	key informant interview
NGO	nongovernmental organization
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
PBGG	peacebuilding, governance, and gender
PM	Prime minister
RDPC	Rassemblement Démocratique du Peuple Camerounais
SCA	Social Cohesion Analysis
SECC	Secure, Empowered, Connected Communities
SGBV	sexual and gender-based violence
SNJP	Service National Justice et Paix
UNHCR	UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNOCHA	UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNSG	United Nations Secretary General
US	United States
USAID	US Agency for International Development
WHO	World Health Organization

Contents

INTRODUCTION	1
Methodology	3
CONTEXT	6
1. History and background	6
2. Political/security	6
3. Refugees and internally displaced persons	9
4. Economic	12
5. Socio-cultural	14
a. Ethnic/language groups	14
b. Religion	15
c. Gender	16
d. Youth	19
e. Mental health	19
6. External influences	20
CONFLICT DYNAMICS	21
1. Key issues in the East	21
a. Introduction to the East Region	21
b. Community-level conflicts over resources	22
c. Agro-pastoral conflicts	22
d. Insecurity and crime	23
e. Ethnic/religious conflict and refugees/host conflict	24
f. Location-specific Issues	25
2. Key issues at the national level	26
a. Uncertainty over national level leadership	26
b. Terrorism (Boko Haram)	26
c. Youth disenfranchisement	27
d. General and cross-cutting issues	27
3. Key actors	27
a. Politico-military groups and leaders: Key actors for conflict	27
b. Moto-taxi drivers: Recruitment community	27
c. Religious leaders and groups: Key actors for peace	28
d. Certain traditional leaders and local authorities	29
e. Women	29
f. Certain national and international NGOs and international organizations (actors for conflict and for peace)	29
4. Grievances	30
5. Identities	30
6. Institutional performance	30
7. Social patterns	32
a. Positive social patterns	32
b. Negative social patterns	33
c. Positive/negative	34
8. Resilience	35

TRAJECTORIES	36
1. Triggers	36
2. Trends	36
CONCLUSIONS	38
RESPONSE OPTIONS	39
1. Transhumance	39
2. Youth	40
3. Gender	40
4. Land	40
5. For international and national organizations – general development and humanitarian approaches ...	41
6. For all – strengthen local authorities and civil society	42
7. For all – social cohesion and civic education – sensitization, training, and capacity-building	42
8. For all – coordination	43
9. For government	43
10. For donors	45
11. General – research	45
APPENDICES	46
1. List of CAF team members	46
2. List of interviewees	46
3. Map	51
4. Response options by research site	52
a. Batouri	52
b. Bertoua	57
c. Garoua-Boulai	60

Introduction

This Social Cohesion Analysis examines the situation in Cameroon in relation to refugees from Central African Republic, focusing in particular on the situation in the East along the CAR border. The analysis is based on USAID's Conflict Assessment Framework¹ conducted for Catholic Relief Services from January 27 through April 5, 2016.²

Cameroon is seen, among many of its neighbors, as a bastion of stability and peace.³ In contrast, its neighbor CAR is seen as a fragile, phantom state, that has been plagued by conflict for decades. Both countries have significant natural resources, though access to them is limited (worse in CAR than Cameroon) and corruption is endemic at all levels of government. Politically, Cameroon is stable, but the situation is somewhat tenuous as the current president has been in power for more than 30 years, and there are restrictions of the freedoms of expression, association, and assembly. In contrast to the relatively peaceful Cameroon, CAR is highly unstable, having had a series of coups and counter-coups, serious and long-term episodes of communal violence and intervention by other countries – resulting in huge numbers of internally displaced persons and massive refugee flows.

Cameroon has been affected, in the last few years, by crises in several neighboring countries (Chad, CAR, and Nigeria) which have caused great insecurity on many fronts, challenging vulnerable communities such as women, children, and the poor – many of whom live in border areas. In this atmosphere of insecurity (physical, food, hygiene, and health), sexual and gender-based violence is prevalent and social cohesion between various groups is threatened.⁴

Cameroon has received large numbers of refugees from both Nigeria and CAR as well as smaller numbers from Chad and other neighboring countries), maintaining an open-border policy for all asylum seekers.⁵ In the region, Cameroon houses the largest number of refugees from CAR, who fled in waves throughout the 2000s. Notably in 2007, 45,000 refugees left CAR – the majority of whom were of the Mbororo ethnic group (often called Peuhl in CAR) and other nomadic cattle herders – due to conflict between government and rebel groups. This exodus was exacerbated by bandits known as *zaraguinas* who specialized in kidnapping children for

Politically, Cameroon is stable, but the situation is somewhat tenuous as the current president has been in power for more than 30 years, and there are restrictions of the freedoms of expression, association, and assembly.



Students at a school in Bedobo, Eastern Cameroon. A large proportion (63 percent) of the population is under 25 years of age. Photo by Michael Stulman/CRS

45,000

refugees arrived in Cameroon from Central African Republic in 2007

1. Using the USAID (2012) Conflict Analysis Framework (CAF) Version 2.0. June 2012. Washington D.C.: USAID. Available at: <https://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do/working-crises-and-conflict/technical-publications>
2. See Preliminary CRS Report on CAR by this author, December 2015 for extensive background on the situation in CAR.
3. UNHCR (2013) Submission by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights' Compilation Report for the 16th Universal Periodic Review: CAMEROON. 22 April – 3 May 2013. Available at: <http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/507525932.pdf>
4. UNOCHA (2015) Aperçu Des Besoins Humanitaires 2016. UNOCHA December 2015, Page 7. Available at <http://reliefweb.int/report/cameroon/cameroun-aper-u-des-besoins-humanitaires-2016-d-cembre-2015>
5. The Government of the Republic of Cameroon has signed all major legal instruments on refugees; the legal framework for refugee protection was signed into law in 2011.

ransom.⁶ After 2007, waves of CAR refugees fled violence from Seleka and anti-balaka forces. The Seleka rebel coalition had seized territory, resulting in the March 2013 coup. Some Seleka began attacking civilians and looting. In response, local defense forces calling themselves the ‘anti-balaka’ were established and attacked civilians they saw as Seleka-aligned. The anti-balaka are commonly identified as Christian, while the Seleka are often associated with the Muslim identity. In mid-2015, 95.8 percent of these refugees were Muslim.⁷ In October 2015, the UNHCR estimated that in Cameroon refugees totaled 423,174 including 138,243 CAR refugees, 63,598 Nigerians in the far north, 21,787 urban refugees, 6,037 asylum seekers, and 92,658 IDPs. Funding requested by UNHCR was US\$75,933,401, of which only 35 percent was funded.⁸

It is within this context that CRS is working in Cameroon. After opening its doors in the country in 1961, CRS first focused on infant mortality and food security. Now CRS has a US\$7.5 million project from 2014-2019 to support orphans and vulnerable children (KIDSS), as well as projects in health, emergency response and recovery, and partnership and capacity strengthening. At the time of this analysis, CRS was in the process of starting a project to work in the East of the country funded by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, with three components: education, community social services, and social cohesion. This analysis is being funded out of CRS’ private funds through CRS in CAR, and its purpose is firstly to assist CRS to identify cross-border issues to consider in its current planning for social cohesion and other projects in CAR.⁹ Secondly, the SCA’s purpose is to inform the design of the planned UNHCR project, as well as ongoing projects (such as the German aid agency Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit’s, or GIZ, infrastructure project for schools and health centers; as well as a water, sanitation and hygiene project) and advise entry points for future projects. The third purpose of this analysis is to provide feedback into CRS programming in Cameroon, based on the various elements of the conflict assessment framework (CAF) – the conflict dynamics and potential trajectories – in order to prevent, manage, and mitigate conflict.

.....
This analysis will assist CRS to identify cross-border issues to consider in its current planning for social cohesion and other projects in CAR.
.....

While there are a multitude of conflict analyses about the situation in CAR, there are very few analyses on Cameroon, though notably, the International Crisis Group in 2014 warned of a violent political transition (which never materialized)¹⁰ and a KPMG Mining Guide in 2010 warned of a similar disruptive transition process. This study found that many interviewees were similarly expressing fears of instability at the national level due to potential national leadership

6. IRIN (2007) Central African Republic-Cameroon: CAR refugees in Cameroon fear returning home. 29 November 2007. Available at: <http://www.irinnews.org/report/75567/central-african-republic-cameroon-car-refugees-in-cameroon-fear-returning-home>

7. UNHCR (2015) Cameroun : Régions de l'Adamaoua, de l'Est et du Nord : Profil des réfugiés centrafricains. UNHCR : 10 June 2015.

8. UNHCR (2015) Cameroon Fact Sheet. October 2015. Available at <http://data.unhcr.org/car/download.php?id=641>

9. In neighboring CAR, CRS is conducting a USAID-funded Secure, Empowered, Connected Communities (SECC) project, which operates in the southeast and northwest and aims to “enable cohesive, self-directed, and connected communities to avoid or reduce their exposure to threats associated with the presence of armed groups and ongoing conflict in areas most vulnerable to attack. The project also addresses ongoing interreligious/inter-communal tensions in CAR.” In addition, CRS has provided assistance to the CAR Inter-religious Platform for Peace (IRP), and is undertaking an additional project, the Central African Republic Interfaith Peacebuilding Partnership (CIPP), which aims to build the capacity of the IRP to support Central African institutions to promote social cohesion. It began in early 2016, funded by USAID.

10. International Crisis Group (2014) Prevention is better than cure. *Africa Briefing* No. 101. 4 September 2014. Available at: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/cameroon/b101-cameroon-prevention-is-better-than-cure.aspx>

transitions, and high youth unemployment. **The key conflict dynamics identified by this Social Cohesion Analysis (SCA) in Cameroon are summarized in the following categories: 1) local level conflicts over resources; 2) agro-pastoral conflicts; 3) insecurity and crime; and 4) ethnic/religious conflict (or refugee-host conflict). The key issues identified at the national level included: 1) uncertainty over national leadership; 2) terrorism; and 3) youth unemployment. However, the single most important finding related to the eastern part of Cameroon was that development support is greatly needed – and if attention is not paid urgently to host communities there, the risk of conflict could rise exponentially.**

The SCA was conducted before and after the presidential and parliamentary elections held between December and March in CAR. Many refugees reported that they had voted, and many were cautiously hopeful that peace and stability would come. The BBC news report on the day of election showed two former fighters, one from (ex)Seleka and one anti-balaka, both saying it was time to stop fighting and move towards national reconciliation – stabilization of the political and economic situation in CAR is crucial to maintaining peace and security in eastern Cameroon.

.....
Stabilization of the political and economic situation in CAR is crucial to maintaining peace and security in eastern Cameroon.
.....

METHODOLOGY

The methodology of this analysis was based upon the USAID Conflict Assessment Framework and its application process document.¹¹ The CAF provides a “rigorous framework for collecting and analyzing data in an objective manner that can be applied uniformly across conflict settings” in order to evaluate the risks of violent conflict and simultaneously to assist development and humanitarian actors to support local efforts to manage conflict and build peace.¹² The CAF starts with the context, and then an analysis of conflict dynamics (grievances, identities, institutional performance, social patterns, resilience, and key actors), and finally examines the trajectories involved (trends and triggers).¹³ Based on these conflict dynamics, response options are developed.

Based on a desk study, key issues that could lead to violent conflict were identified, then key informant interviews conducted in Yaoundé and eastern Cameroon. The targeted locations for this assessment included areas in the East Region of Cameroon bordering CAR, where CRS’ upcoming UNHCR project is focused: Batouri, Bertoua, and Garoua-Boulai. In addition, the SCA addressed general national-level issues, through information collected in interviews in the East as well as Yaoundé. CRS cooperated with two local partners for this SCA (with whom they work on various other projects): Comité Diocésain d’Activités Socio-Caritatives (CODASCaritas or CODASC) in Batouri, and Commission Diocésaine Justice et Paix (CDJP) in Bertoua and

11. USAID (2012) Conflict Analysis Framework (CAF) Version 2.0. June 2012. Washington D.C.: USAID, and USAID (2012) Conflict Assessment Framework Application Guide.

June 2012. Washington D.C.: USAID. Available at: <https://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do/working-crises-and-conflict/technical-publications>

12. USAID (2012) Conflict Analysis Framework (CAF) Version 2.0. June 2012. Washington D.C.: USAID. Available at: <https://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do/working-crises-and-conflict/technical-publications> Page 3.

13. Institutions may perform in legitimate and effective ways that identity groups perceive as positive social patterns that serve to mitigate conflict, or, they may perform in illegitimate, ineffective ways that drive conflict. Resilience refers to the ability of the institutions or other factors to respond to potential conflict in non-violent ways. Key actors mobilize people and resources to engage in violence, based on grievances.

Garoua-Boulai.¹⁴ The local partners identified nine local participant researchers who, along with three CRS staff members, brought important local knowledge (some had specific peacebuilding or trauma-healing knowledge) to deepen the analysis. At the same time, these participant researchers would benefit from the capacity-building provided by the training and could be called upon to assist in future updates of the social cohesion assessment both for their own organizations and for CRS.

Interviewees were selected based upon the identification of key issues that could potentially cause conflict, and then key actors for peace and for conflict were targeted. Interviewees included government authorities, traditional chiefs, teachers, security forces, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, women's and youth groups, agro/pastoralists, refugees, and host communities (See Appendix 2 for the list of interviewees). Interview questions were based on sample questions in the CAF, and those used in the West Africa Conflict Assessment,¹⁵ subsequently revised by the research teams to fit the local context. The teams conducted 135 interviews with 165 people in the east, and 12 interviews with 14 people in Yaoundé. There were 34 women and 145 men, with ages ranging from 13 to 80. Among the interviewees were 6 expatriates (from Germany, Ethiopia, France, the Philippines, and the United States), 15 local authorities, 22 traditional leaders, 14 religious leaders, 17 refugee leaders, 19 NGO staff, 14 youth association representatives, 7 women's association representatives, 13 civil society organization representatives, 10 members of the security sector, and 4 unknown. Among the Cameroonian and CAR interviewees, there were 41 of Gbaya ethnicity, 12 Mbororo, 9 Kako'o, 5 Haoussa, 16 Foulbé/Fulfuldé, and a few others. Of the CAR interviewees, 44 were refugees. We were not able to ask the ethnic identity of 56 interviewees. Religious identities included 24 Catholic, 84 other Christian, 58 Muslim, and 12 unknown. Due to the selection criteria of key actors such as religious leaders and security forces, and the necessity to meet first with local authorities and traditional leaders in each research site, many more men than women were interviewed. There were also only 3 women among the 14 study team members, and only one of the 14 was Muslim.

Three teams of 4 people (see Appendix 1 for list of team members) underwent 3 days of training, then each team spent 10 to 12 days in the field, with the consultant conducting additional interviews in the East Region and Yaoundé. Interviews were 30 to 90 minutes long and conducted most often by two people – each site team of four people separated into two groups of two, one person to ask questions and one to take notes – though initial interviews with local authorities and traditional chiefs were usually held with the entire team. Each team then discussed the interview and filled out an interview summary sheet for each interview with categories based on the CAF (key mobilizers, institutional performance, etc.).

14. CRS and the consultant attempted also to coordinate with the Lutheran World Federation, which is conducting a similar project in the North of the country, but unfortunately the schedules for these two analyses did not align.

15. The West Africa Conflict Assessment was a USAID-funded project carried out by Associates for Rural Development (at later stages under the management of Tetra Tech) in 2010 and 2011. See Tetra Tech (2011) Early warning and response design support (EWARDS) Final Report. October 2011: Tetra Tech for USAID. Available at: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pdacu129.pdf and Associates for Rural Development (2010) Early Warning and Response Design Support (EWARDS) Côte D'Ivoire Conflict Assessment. July 2010: ARD for USAID. Available at: http://www.stjohns-chs.org/history/scamillo_courses/global-studies/ewards-cote-divoire-conflic.pdf

Questions for major categories of interviewees (religious leaders, local authorities, women's groups, etc.) were developed during the training, and were used as a guideline during interviews. Interviews were semi-structured and data collected was qualitative except for the demographic information on each interviewee. At the end of the data collection period, each team finalized all their data and prepared a presentation that was discussed in a two-day debrief session. During the debrief, response options were developed by each team, and were then discussed in the larger group. Based on the team presentations and knowledge of the management team (two co-trainers and a CRS focal point), the consultant developed a PowerPoint presentation that was presented to the two key partner organization directors (who were both key actors in social cohesion activities and in promoting peace and dialogue) in the East (CDJP and CODASC). After minor revisions, the summary was presented to key staff in CRS and additional response options generated. The results were transferred to an Excel chart and reviewed by the consultant. This report is the expanded version of those validated results, supplemented by a review of the literature and another review of the data.

As this social cohesion assessment is based upon the CAF, this report follows that structure: context, conflict dynamics (key actors, grievances, identities, institutional performance, social patterns, resilience), conclusions, and response options.

Context

1. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND

French Cameroon gained its independence from France in 1960 and merged with British Cameroon as a Federal Republic in 1961. In 1972, it became the United Republic of Cameroon under a new Constitution. In 1982, Paul Biya became President, and remains so today after ensuring a constitutional amendment in 2008 that removed the two-term limit. Cameroon has been widely praised for its ability to maintain the calm and peaceful coexistence of its numerous ethnic and religious groups – it has been called a bastion of stability – notable when compared to numerous conflicts in neighboring countries.¹⁶ However, previous and/or simmering tensions have been reported along various axes in Cameroon’s history, including divides between the north and south, east and west, and between the French-speaking majority and the English-speaking minority.¹⁷

.....
Cameroon has been widely praised for its ability to maintain the calm and peaceful coexistence of its numerous ethnic and religious groups – it has been called a bastion of stability – notable when compared to numerous conflicts in neighboring countries.
.....

Cameroon has great geographical and cultural diversity and its ecosystems range from tropical forests to highland savannahs, including beaches, mountains (and an active volcano), and deserts. It is rich in natural resources (including minerals, oil, natural gas, and water). However, corruption, political obstacles, and lack of infrastructure have hampered development.

Conflict in neighboring CAR and Chad has had direct effects in Cameroon. The conflict in CAR between the Seleka and anti-balaka has resulted in widespread violence that spilled over the border into Cameroon, with various armed groups and splinter factions attacking civilians, refugees and armed forces. Furthermore, in CAR, the central government has had extremely weak control of and reach to the periphery. Many CAR citizens from the border areas of Cameroon have become refugees, or in some cases have been living across the border in Cameroon, including some who are contesting local elections.

2. POLITICAL/SECURITY

Cameroon is a republic, with a presidential republic and multi-party democracy. Its latest constitution was written in 1996, and amended in 2008. The legal system is mixed between (French) civil law, (British) common law, and customary law.¹⁸ Citizenship is not granted by birth, and at least one parent has to be a citizen of Cameroon. Paul Biya has been president since 1982 (almost five 7-year terms), and Philemon Yang has been prime minister since 2009, appointed by the president. In the 2011 election, Biya obtained 78 percent of the vote, which was labeled as flawed, but not enough to have a significant impact on the outcome. In 2013, two sets of elections were held (legislative and municipal) which resulted in a landslide victory (148 seats) for President Biya’s (Cameroon

16. UNHCR (2013) Submission by the United Nations High Commissioner for refugees (UNHCR) for the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights’ Compilation Report for the 16th Universal Periodic Review: CAMEROON. 22 April – 3 May 2013. Page 1. Available at: <http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/507525932.pdf>

17. OHCHR (2013) UN Expert on minority issues welcomes Cameroon’s efforts and urges important next steps to protect minorities. 11 September 2013. Available at: <http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=13711&LangID=E>

18. See for example Fomba, C.M. (2007) Researching Cameroonian law. June/July 2007: GlobaLex. Available at: <http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Cameroon.html>

People's Democratic Movement (CPDM) or the Rassemblement Démocratique du Peuple Camerounais (RDPC) in French. Although the Supreme Court received submissions of 40 challenges, none were accepted,¹⁹ and the results were declared free and fair.²⁰ The Parliament includes a Senate with 100 seats (14 of whom are taken by women), and a National Assembly with 180 seats. The Senate was elected for the first time in 2013, in spite of its creation in the 1996 constitution – the creation of the Senate was requested by civil society actors in the hopes of promoting power-sharing – its most significant role is to take on executive power in the absence of the head of state.

President Biya has been described as extremely skilled in balancing the very complicated regional, political, and ethnic power dynamics of the country, and many observers have expressed concern about the lack of a public succession plan, and fear of disruption or instability in his absence, especially given his age of 83 years.²¹

The internal security of Cameroon is taken care of by the national police, the Direction Générale de la Recherche Extérieure (DGRE or intelligence service), the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Territorial Administration, and the Presidential Guard. "Police remained ineffective, poorly trained, and corrupt, however. Impunity continued to be a problem."²² The Ministry of Defense controls the army, the gendarmerie, a military security unit, and the DGRE – and is under the direct control of the president. A special rapid intervention unit (the BIR or Brigade Intervention Rapide) was created in 2001 due to banditry, hostage-taking, and looting at the eastern and northern borders with CAR, Chad, and Nigeria. However, in 2008, when the BIR was mobilized against protests against rising consumer costs, local authorities estimated 40 were killed and human rights groups objected. In spite of the presence of the BIR, the border between Cameroon and CAR is plagued with crime: the incidence of banditry and kidnapping has mushroomed in the border region. Bandits from CAR are accused of crossing the border into Cameroon to commit robbery and kidnapping.²³

Crime in general is high in Cameroon, especially targeting the wealthy in urban areas, with street crime, thefts from vehicles, residential break-ins, highway banditry, and armed robberies.²⁴ There have been terrorist attacks by Boko Haram in the North and Far North, and in 2013 and 2014 they took 21 expatriates hostage.²⁵

.....
There have been terrorist attacks by Boko Haram in the North and Far North.
.....

19. KPMG Global Mining Institute (2013) Cameroon country mining guide. Available at: <http://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/cameroon-mining-guide.pdf>

20. US State Dept. (2015) Cameroon 2014 human rights report. Available at: <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/236550.pdf>

21. KPMG Global Mining Institute (2013) Cameroon country mining guide. Available at: <http://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/cameroon-mining-guide.pdf>

22. US State Dept. (2015) Cameroon 2014 human rights report. Available at: <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/236550.pdf>

23. US State Department Overseas Security Advisory Council (2015) Cameroon 2015 Crime and Safety Report. Available at: <https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=17681>

24. US State Department Overseas Security Advisory Council (2015) Cameroon 2015 Crime and Safety Report. Available at: <https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=17681>

25. US State Department Overseas Security Advisory Council (2015) Cameroon 2015 Crime and Safety Report. Available at: <https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=17681>

The judiciary is inefficient and corrupt but can also demonstrate independence and impartiality, though court orders are frequently ignored by government officials.²⁶ Both national and customary courts make up the judicial system: criminal cases usually go to national courts, while domestic issues such as succession, inheritance, and child custody cases often go to customary courts. The customary courts follow the customs of the largest local ethnic group. Traditional methods of dispute resolution are often used, especially in the North and Far North, but these sometimes resulted in allegations of arbitrary detention against some traditional leaders.²⁷ In contrast to CAR where the incidence of witchcraft is frequent and widespread, a US State Department Human Rights report stated that in 2014 there were no arrests or trials for witchcraft in Cameroon.²⁸

Cameroon has multiple laws protecting its citizens' human rights, and is signatory to the major international human rights instruments.²⁹ It has had visits from the Special Rapporteurs on Torture, Minority Rights, and the Right to Food. While the country has been politically stable, there have been allegations against the President of electoral irregularities and oppression of the opposition; he has managed to maintain control even though he has often been absent from public view. The government has been reported to monitor political meetings and has threatened and harassed those who criticize the government; critical journalists have been silenced using libel laws as well as through violence and arrest.³⁰ The government has not interfered with internet freedom, but has prevented freedom of assembly.

.....
Cameroon has multiple laws protecting its citizens' human rights, and is signatory to the major international human rights instruments.
.....

The UN Human Rights Council conducted a Universal Periodic Review in May 2013 and noted many concerns including: extra-judicial executions by law enforcement officers; vigilante justice; widespread torture; deaths in custody by security forces; illegal and arbitrary arrest; a high level of violence against women, girls, and children; child labor; sexual exploitation and trafficking of children; harassment of journalists; and vulnerability of indigenous peoples. The 2014 US State Department Human Rights Report identified the most important abuses as: "security force torture and abuse, particularly of detainees and prisoners; denial of fair and speedy public trial; and life-threatening prison conditions.³¹ As refugees are by situation often in contact with security forces, these human rights abuses are of considerable importance. Although the government took some steps to punish and prosecute officials who committed abuses in the security forces and in the public service, these actors were often still able to act with impunity."³²

26. US State Dept. (2015) Cameroon 2014 human rights report. Available at: <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/236550.pdf>
27. US State Dept. (2015) Cameroon 2014 human rights report. Available at: <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/236550.pdf>
28. US State Dept. (2015) Cameroon 2014 human rights report. Available at: <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/236550.pdf>
29. See OHCHR website: http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=30&Lang=EN
30. US State Dept. (2015) Cameroon 2014 human rights report. Available at: <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/236550.pdf>
31. US State Dept. (2015) Cameroon 2014 human rights report. Available at: <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/236550.pdf>
32. US State Dept. (2015) Cameroon 2014 human rights report. Available at: <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/236550.pdf>

3. REFUGEES AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS

UNOCHA reported in its 2016 *Overview of Needs* that 2.7 million people had been identified as being in need of protection and/or food assistance—of whom 2.4 million are Cameroonian and 323,000 are refugees—and 14 percent of whom live in the East.³³ More than 400,000 people were forced to flee from violence in the regions of Adamawa, East, North, and Extreme North, and according to UNOCHA, more than 253,000 Central African and 65,000 Nigerian refugees, as well as 93,000 IDPs and 19,000 returnees, needed assistance in Cameroon. There are 10,854 refugees and approximately 6,000 asylum seekers from Cameroon living outside the country.

2.7 million

people are in need of protection and/or food assistance

According to a different figure from the UNHCR, of the 259,145 Central Africans living outside urban areas, 180,485 were living in the East, 71,506 in Adamawa, and 7,154 in the North. There are also 10,600 refugees living in the Yaoundé urban area, and further 7,700 in the major city of Douala.³⁴ The Central Africans are living in 314 sites and villages, 71,000 in seven improved sites supported by UNHCR, though access to water, sanitation, and hygiene remain limited. Others share homes with host families, have built their own shelter, or are living in the open.³⁵ According to a different total from UNOCHA, of 253,000 Central African refugees, 43 percent arrived before 2014, and 57 percent afterwards.³⁶ Cameroonian hosts in need numbered 553,000, with 336,000 in the Extreme North.

Specific details about the refugees in the East indicate that about 30 percent are located in five camps (which the government of Cameroon calls “sites aménagés” or “improved sites” for legal reasons). These are Gado-Badzere, Mbile, Lolo, Timangolo, and Ngarisingo (See map in Appendix 3). The other 70 percent have settled into host villages, which generally set aside tracts of land where all the refugees can set up a community within the village boundaries.³⁷ Fortunately, most of these 85 or so locations are clustered along the axes between the three major cities: Bertoua, the regional capital of the East, Batouri, a sub-office hub where CRS’ regional partner is located, and Garoua-Boulai, the border city where many refugees are located.³⁸ Other statistics indicate that almost half of the refugees that arrived since 2013 are in improved sites, and the other half with host communities.³⁹ UNHCR-reported refugees from

33. UNOCHA (2015) *Aperçu Des Besoins Humanitaires 2016*. UNOCHA December 2015. Available at <http://reliefweb.int/report/cameroon/cameroun-aper-u-des-besoins-humanitaires-2016-d-cembre-2015>

34. UNHCR (2016) *Réponse Régionale à la crise des Réfugiés en République centrafricaine : Portail Interagence de partage de l'Information*. Cameroon: East. UNHCR: 14 March 2016. Available at : <http://data.unhcr.org/car/region.php?id=33&country=44>

35. UNOCHA (2015) *Aperçu Des Besoins Humanitaires 2016*. UNOCHA December 2015. Available at <http://reliefweb.int/report/cameroon/cameroun-aper-u-des-besoins-humanitaires-2016-d-cembre-2015>

36. UNOCHA (2015) *Aperçu Des Besoins Humanitaires 2016*. UNOCHA December 2015. Available at <http://reliefweb.int/report/cameroon/cameroun-aper-u-des-besoins-humanitaires-2016-d-cembre-2015>

37. UNHCR (2015) *Central African Republic - Regional Refugee Response Plan - Jan-Dec 2016 version 2*. UNHCR. Page 23. Available at: <http://data.unhcr.org/car/country.php?id=44>

38. UNHCR (2016) *Réponse Régionale à la crise des Réfugiés en République centrafricaine : Portail Interagence de partage de l'Information*. Cameroon: East. UNHCR: 14 March 2016. Available at : <http://data.unhcr.org/car/region.php?id=33&country=44>

39. EC. *Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection: ECHO Factsheet Cameroon*. April 2016. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/cameroon_en.pdf
The US State Department report reported less than 50 percent were in refugee camps; See US State Dept. (2015) *Cameroon 2014 human rights report*. Page 21. Available at: <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/236550.pdf>

CAR living in Cameroon have come from the following prefectures in CAR: Nana-Mambéré, 32 percent ; Ouham-Pendé, 21 percent; Bangui, 16 percent; Mambéré-Kadéï, 14 percent; Ombella-M'Poko, 10 percent; and other, 7 percent.⁴⁰

Refugees face a host of challenges in Cameroon. They are at high risk (along with other vulnerable communities) of violence, sexual exploitation, and stigma – as well as police harassment, including violence, arrest, detention, and extortion.

Although Cameroon has an open asylum policy, and has accepted hundreds of thousands of refugees, the support is extremely underfunded, and this study will show that the refugees are not necessarily welcomed by local communities. Food is scarce both inside the camps and in host communities. While refugees in the sites may attend schools built especially for them, those living in host communities may attend local schools – some of the schools then receive additional funding from the UNHCR or other NGOs for the extra children.⁴¹

In 2016, the UNHCR and the Cameroon government began preparations for biometric registration and verification of all refugees and asylum seekers in Cameroon: “This operation aims to ensure better protection and assistance for refugees by verifying and updating their profiles, including family relationships, specific needs etc. For the refugees, this exercise will include the delivery of new and standardized refugee certificates, new ration cards and the renewal of identification cards. In the longer term, biometric registration is critical for obtaining reliable data on refugee movements and statistics.”

While Cameroon has been criticized for its treatment of refugees, it has sought additional assistance from the humanitarian community – the refugees place a huge burden on already challenged local administrations and communities. When refugees leave the camps in search of livelihoods (many complain of insufficient support in the camps), the Cameroonian authorities are reported to arrest them and force them back to the camps.⁴² While the government prefers the refugees to remain in the improved sites, many prefer to be living with host communities where they have more freedom of movement and can participate in commerce, so some prefer to remain unregistered. There continues to be some movement across borders, especially by cattle herders who have done so for centuries.

The elections in CAR, in which refugees in Cameroon were allowed to vote, were an important development that occurred during this SCA. The UNHCR conducted sensitization activities with refugees in Cameroon to allow them to vote and 109,000 were initially identified for the first round of the presidential election on 27 December 2015.⁴³ Elections ran relatively smoothly, and about 60 percent of

.....
Refugees are at high risk of violence, sexual exploitation, and stigma – as well as police harassment, including violence, arrest, detention, and extortion.
.....

40. UNHCR (2015) Cameroun : Régions de l'Adamaoua, de l'Est et du Nord : Profil des réfugiés centrafricains. UNHCR : 10 June 2015.
41. Interview with UNHCR staff.
42. VOA (2015) CAR refugees face difficult living conditions in Cameroon. 17 August 2015. Available at: <http://www.voanews.com/content/difficult-living-conditions-for-car-refugees-in-cameroon/2921047.html>
43. However, of the total 460,000 refugees outside of CAR, the majority of whom are Muslim, only 26 percent were registered to vote. See Essa, A. (2015) Everything you need to know about elections in CAR. Al Jazeera: 30 December 2015. Available at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/12/elections-car-151229200503671.html>

eligible refugees voted.⁴⁴ The run-off election was between the two final candidates (both former prime ministers): Faustin-Archange Touadéra (PM under François Bozizé, and a former math professor and university official who has remained in Bangui since 2013) and Anicet-Georges Dologuélé (PM under Ange-Félix Patassé, and a former president of the Development Bank of Central African States). Both candidates promised peace, security, unification, and reconciliation of the country. In the run-off election held on February 14, 2016, Touadéra won 63 percent of the vote, and on February 20, Dologuélé conceded defeat, though he expressed concern about irregularities.⁴⁵

There are several studies about refugees in Cameroon, most done in 2014 and only a handful in 2015. The Danish Refugee Council studied the perceptions of CAR refugees in September 2014 in eastern Cameroon, analyzing push and pull factors, and concluded that most refugees at that time intended to return to their homes in CAR. A social cohesion analysis of CAR refugees in Chad and eastern Cameroon was commissioned by CRS in August 2014, and found that social ties between religious and ethnic groups in CAR were torn. The analysis also explored the effects of the refugees on the host communities in Cameroon. At that time, a key concern of the refugees was meeting basic needs, as most had arrived in extremely vulnerable conditions. Short-term social cohesion programming was recommended to mend relationships between refugees and host communities that were strained due to limited resources, while long-term measures were recommended to deal with negative perceptions held by Central Africans (Christians) against Muslims and Chadians. Both this 2014 CRS study and another, commissioned in November 2015 by the UNHCR on agropastoral conflicts, focused on a primary source of conflict over land and resources between various combinations of farmers and herders, and refugees and host communities. A 2014 UNHCR Rapid Needs Assessment came to the following conclusions concerning causes of conflict:

As regards peaceful coexistence, refugees are usually well received and in many cases, hosted by local communities in Cameroon, due to ethnic similarities and to previous interventions by UNHCR by which the arrival of refugees has been linked to improvements in social infrastructure. Currently, observations by UNHCR field staff had so far identified access to resources (including firewood, water, land and social services) as the most important element that needs to be addressed to ensure peaceful coexistence between the refugee and the host community. According to the preliminary result of the assessment, agro-pastoral problems are the most important cause of conflict in communities (30 percent of sites), followed by access to water (16 percent) and access to land (12 percent). Of course, it would be important to disaggregate these data by type of site – given that until now, UNHCR had assumed that access to firewood and services were the most important source of tensions in villages close to refugee sites.⁴⁶

.....
Refugees are usually well received and in many cases, hosted by local communities in Cameroon, due to ethnic similarities.
.....

44. UNHCR (2016) Thousands of refugees vote in second round of CAR presidential election. UNHCR News Stories 16 February 2016. Available at: <http://www.unhcr.org.uk/news-and-views/news-list/news-detail/article/thousands-of-refugees-vote-in-second-round-of-car-presidential-election.html>

45. Aljazeera (2016) Central African Republic: Touadéra wins election. Aljazeera: 21 February 2016. Available at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/02/central-african-republic-touadéra-wins-election-160221044730048.html>

46. UNHCR Cameroon (2014) Situation of refugees out of camps – preliminary report of the Rapid Needs Assessment. 17 September 2014.

Although the findings of this SCA are similar to those in the assessment above, they are not identical and the bulk of this report expands on these types of findings. Currently, as the security situation in CAR remains unstable, there has been little discussion of refugee return.


4. ECONOMIC

Cameroon borders Nigeria, Chad, Central African Republic, Republic of the Congo, Gabon, and Equatorial Guinea. It is roughly the size of California at 475,440 square km and has a population of 23.7 million (while CAR is 622,984 square km and has population of 4.5 million). Cameroon has 10 regions, one of which, the East, is the focus of this report.⁴⁷ Forest, park, and protected land encompass 56 percent of the country.⁴⁸ Bertoua is the capital of the East region.

Cameroon is classified as a lower middle income nation, and CAR, low income. The gross national income (GNI) per capita is US\$1,350 (2014) and the GDP US\$32.05 billion. Some 40 percent of the population lives in poverty (2007). In CAR, the GNI was US\$30 (2013), the GDP US\$1.72 billion, and 62 percent of the population lives in poverty.⁴⁹

In Cameroon the net official development aid received was US\$737.49 million (2013) while in CAR, the figure was US\$189.25 million (2013) – per capita, the figures are US\$33 and US\$40 respectively.⁵⁰ Both Cameroon and CAR are classified as countries of “low human development” (along with much of Africa): Cameroon ranks 153 on the UNDP Human Development Index and CAR is 187.⁵¹ While development stagnated from 1990 to 2000, in the last two decades it has been slowly rising in Cameroon.

While unemployment rates are generally low in Cameroon (around 5 percent of the working population according to the World Bank), underemployment is reportedly a problem. The majority of the labor force is in the informal agricultural sector (53 percent) or the informal non-agricultural sector (37 percent), resulting in low productivity and low income for workers.⁵² Both supply (better through the quality of literacy) and demand (through more jobs in the formal sector, and more productive jobs) are needed.⁵³ Cameroon ranked 136 out of 175 on Transparency International's 2014 Corruption Perception Index, with a score of 27 out of 100 (CAR is 150th and 24 respectively).⁵⁴ Corruption is described by KPMG and other business assessments as being one of the main obstacles to foreign investment, and it is a serious impediment to good governance and general socio-economic development.



47. These regions include: Adamawa, Centre, East, Far North, Littoral, North, Northwest, South, Southwest, and West.

48. Tedonkeng, E. (2008) Cameroon: Country pasture/forage resource profiles. Available at: <http://www.fao.org/ag/agp/agpc/doc/counprof/cameroon/cameroon.htm>

49. World Bank (2015) World Development Indicators. Available at: <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&country=CMR&series=&period=>

50. World Bank (2015) Data: Net ODA Received per capita (US\$). Available at: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ODAT.PC.ZS>

51. See <http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries>

52. KPMG Global Mining Institute (2013) Cameroon country mining guide. Available at: <http://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/issuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/cameroon-mining-guide.pdf>

53. World Bank, Cameroon Country Office. (2012) Unlocking the labor force: An economic update on cameroon with a focus on employment. Available at: https://blogs.worldbank.org/african/files/african/economic_update_issue_no_3_-_jobs_in_cameroon.pdf

54. Transparency International (2014) Corruption measurements tools. Available at <https://www.transparency.org/country/#CMR> and <https://www.transparency.org/country/#CAF>

Cameroon is reported to have a variety of minerals and fuels, but many of these are as yet either in the exploration phase, or not yet explored (minerals include bauxite, cobalt, cassiterite (the main ore of tin), gold from lode deposits, granite, iron ore, lignite, nepheline-syenite, nickel, sapphires, rubies, rutile, and uranium).⁵⁵ Lack of exploration and reduced production have been attributed to a lack of infrastructure (transport and power), high levels of corruption, lack of financing, and a generally difficult business environment.⁵⁶ Mineral commodities produced include aluminum, cement, petroleum, and sand, while gold and diamonds are mined on an artisanal scale (often by Central Africans). Gold, diamonds, and several other minerals are prevalent in the east and southeast of the country. Cameroon is the fifth-largest producer of petroleum in the Sub-Saharan region, but its natural gas resources remain untapped, and oil production has stagnated in the last few years. Hydroelectric power is similarly underexplored, but said to have the highest potential on the African continent: yet 85 percent of the population in rural areas are not connected to electricity grids.⁵⁷

Cameroon lies across the path of transhumance corridors—seasonal livestock movement for grazing—between Nigeria, Chad, CAR, and Sudan, particularly in more arid areas of the Sahel.⁵⁸ People have been moving through these corridors for millennia, and the migratory practice allows various nomadic peoples seeking water and grazing resources to withstand ecological and climatic changes. Pastoralists provide substantial numbers of livestock to domestic, regional, and international markets. Cattle provide 54 percent of Cameroon’s meat consumption per inhabitant, poultry 17 percent, pigs 15 percent, and sheep and goats 13 percent.⁵⁹ Transhumance also allows for shared cultural practice of the various nomadic groups to strengthen family ties within and across ethnic groups.

.....
Cameroon lies across the path of transhumance corridors—seasonal livestock movement for grazing—between Nigeria, Chad, CAR, and Sudan.

However, pastoral areas of Africa have some of the lowest indicators of human development and food security on the continent.⁶⁰ Pastoralists often live in remote, underdeveloped areas that are conflict prone. The number of conflicts has been increasing since the 1980s, exacerbated by the many violent political conflicts in the region; furthermore, ethnic identities and differences between “local” versus “foreigner” began to characterize the conflicts.⁶¹ Thus individual conflicts can expand into family, community, or even ethnic conflicts based on the culture of various groups and how they

55. U.S. Department of the Interior U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) (2011) 2011 Minerals Yearbook: Cameroon and Cape Verde. Available at: <http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/2011/myb3-2011-cm-cv.pdf>

56. The World Bank ranks Cameroon 168 of 189 countries in ease of doing business. See: “The World Bank Group (2013). Doing Business 2014: Understanding Regulations for Small and Medium-Size Enterprises, Comparing Business Regulations for Domestic Firms in 189 Economies, 11th Edition, Page 3. Report available here: <http://www.doingbusiness.org/-/media/WBG/DoingBusiness/Documents/Annual-Reports/English/DB14-Full-Report.pdf>.

57. KPMG Global Mining Institute (2013) Cameroon Country mining guide. Available at: <http://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/cameroon-mining-guide.pdf>

58. This is also known as the “Nigeria Zone” where animals come from Chad, Niger, Sudan and CAR to supply Cameroon, Nigeria, Benin and Togo. See Abiola, F.A., et al. (2005). Socio-economic and animal health impact of transhumance. Ecole Inter-Etats des Sciences et Médecine Vétérinaires BP 5 077 Dakar, Senegal. Available at: <http://www.oie.int/doc/ged/d3248.pdf>

59. Tedonkeng, E. (2008) Cameroon: Country pasture/forage resource profiles. Available at: <http://www.fao.org/ag/agp/agpc/doc/counprof/cameroon/cameroon.htm>

60. African Union (2011) Department of Rural Economy and Agriculture Policy Framework For Pastoralism In Africa: Securing, protecting and improving the lives, livelihoods and rights of pastoralist communities, October 2010 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Available at: <http://rea.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Policy%20Framework%20for%20Pastoralism.pdf>

61. Kossouma Liba’a, N. (2015) Etude sur les Conflits Agro-Pastoraux dans les Régions Camerounaises du Nord, Adamaoua et Est : Rapport Final. Lutheran World Federation (Commissioned by UNHCR): December 2015. Page 12.

use space, conduct various activities, or even the characteristics of the groups.

Expanding crop cultivation into pastoral corridors (often due to population pressure) and the effects of various regional conflicts has increased the incidence of agropastoral conflicts as corridor size decreases and locations change – the most common conflicts are damage to crops by herds, and secondly, theft of animals. In these transhumance areas, 70 to 90 percent of the cattle and 30 to 40 percent of the goats and sheep are involved in this important sector of economic activity.⁶² Transhumance is regulated under various laws, regulations, and regional mechanisms, but many of these may be contradictory and are often not well enforced. For ECOWAS and CEMAC countries, an International Transhumance Certificate is required for cross-border movements and the African Union created a Pastoral Policy Framework in 2011.⁶³

5. SOCIO-CULTURAL

Cameroon's population is 23.73 million (approximately five times that of CAR) and 43 percent is aged 0-14 years, and 20 percent 15-24 years.⁶⁴ It has a highly urban population (54 percent). While a relatively large percentage of the urban population has access to improved water sources (95 percent) and sanitation (62 percent), the rural population has only 53 percent and 27 percent respectively. Literacy of the total population is 75 percent (81 percent male, 68 percent female). There are 76 mobile phone subscriptions and 11 internet users per 100 people (2014). Life expectancy at birth is 56 years and infant mortality is 61 per 1,000 live births: only 5 percent of infants are lacking DPT immunizations at age 1 year. When disaggregated for gender, life expectancy is 56 and 54 years respectively for women and men in Cameroon, but in CAR is 51 and 48 years. The incidence of HIV and AIDS is 4.3 percent.⁶⁵

75%
Literacy of the total population
is 75 percent (81 percent male,
68 percent female)

a. Ethnic/language groups

There are more than 250 ethnic groups in Cameroon, the largest of which are Cameroon highlanders (31 percent); Equatorial Bantu (19 percent); Kirdi (11 percent); Fulani (10 percent); Northwestern Bantu (8 percent); Eastern Nigritic (7 percent); other African (13 percent); and non-African (less than 1 percent).⁶⁶ Fulani in Cameroon are also known as Mbororo or sometimes Peuhl and are usually nomadic pastoralists, primarily Muslim. There are 24 different major language groups, though French and English are the two official languages of the country.

In an older UNHCR estimate as of June 2015, wherein the most recent religious breakdown of the refugee population was conducted, of the 225,767 Central Africans in the East, North, and Adamawa, 94.8 percent were Muslim, 2.6 percent Protestant, 2.3 percent Catholic,

62. OECD. Promoting and supporting change in transhumant pastoralism in the Sahel and West Africa. OECD Policy Note Number 3. Available at: <https://www.oecd.org/swac/publications/38402714.pdf>

63. See <http://rea.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Policy%20Framework%20for%20Pastoralism.pdf>

64. Statistics in this paragraph unless otherwise indicated are from: CIA World Factbook (2016) Cameroon. 5 April 2016. Available at: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cm.html>

65. République du Cameroun (2011) Enquête Démographique et de Santé et à Indicateurs Multiples EDS-MICS 2011 Rapport Préliminaire sur la prévalence du VIH. February 2012 : l'Institut National de la Statistique. Available at : http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PBAAB077.pdf

66. CIA World Factbook (2016) Cameroon. 5 April 2016. Available at: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cm.html>

and 0.3 percent other. Mbororo made up 53 percent, Peuhl 31 percent, Fulbe 4 percent, Gbaya 4 percent, Hausa 3 percent, and 5 percent other or unknown.

b. Religion

In Cameroon, 40 percent of the population is classified as indigenous/traditional, 40 percent Christian, and 20 percent Muslim.⁶⁷ Traditionally there has been a great degree of religious tolerance, especially compared to the conflicts in neighboring Nigeria and CAR. However, a September 2015 ICG report warned about the increase in both Christian revivalist and Muslim fundamentalist movements, which threaten to increase religious intolerance, especially in the North. Also, there have been conflicts between traditional Sufi Islam (dominated by the Fulani) and the more conservative Wahhabism (promoted by young Cameroonian Muslims from the South).⁶⁸ The presence of a large number of predominantly Muslim refugees in the East of Cameroon has complicated the situation, as the area has traditionally had a Christian majority. In some villages, the majority religion has changed from Christian to Muslim as new waves of refugees have arrived. Since many refugees (both Christian and Muslim) were targeted by the ex-Seleka and the anti-balaka armed groups respectively, many hold grievances and desire revenge.

.....
Traditionally there has been a great degree of religious tolerance, especially compared to the conflicts in neighboring Nigeria and CAR.
.....

Other conflicts have been reported between the traditional Protestant and Catholic churches and the new revivalist groups – whose leaders frequently preach intolerance.⁶⁹

At least 380 civilians were killed by Boko Haram in 2014 and 2015, while the security forces' response has resulted in the destruction of civilian property and the detention of more than 1,000 suspects. Some 130 men and boys are missing.⁷⁰ In addition to the Mbororo refugees fleeing bandits in CAR, there was also an incident of conflict between Mbororo and the Catholic University in Bamenda, Cameroon: the university evicted 300 Mbororo from their ancestral lands after a long-standing land dispute. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) defined the Mbororo pastoralists as indigenous minorities, which make up approximately 12 percent of the population and often face conflicts over access to land and water.⁷¹ The situation was investigated by the UN Special Rapporteur for Minority Rights and presented to the UN Human Rights Council.

In contrast to CAR, there was much less mention of witchcraft and sorcery, (except when noted as a recruitment tool for armed groups). While there were no prosecutions for sorcery or witchcraft in Cameroon in 2014, practices at the local level still exist, though many Cameroonians were reluctant to speak of them. In a study of youth involvement in the

67. CIA World Factbook (2016) Cameroon. 5 April 2016. Available at: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cm.html>

68. ICG (2015) Cameroon: The threat of religious radicalism. *Africa Report* N°229 | 3 September 2015. Available at: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/-/media/Files/africa/central-africa/229-cameroon-the-threat-of-religious-radicalism.pdf>

69. ICG (2015) Cameroon: The threat of religious radicalism *Africa Report* N°229 | 3 September 2015. Available at: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/-/media/Files/africa/central-africa/229-cameroon-the-threat-of-religious-radicalism.pdf>

70. Amnesty International (2015) Hundreds slaughtered by Boko Haram in Cameroon and abused by security forces. 15 September 2015. Available at: <http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/hundreds-slaughtered-by-boko-haram-in-cameroon-and-abused-by-security-forces>

71. OHCHR (2014) Cameroon: UN experts on minorities and indigenous peoples concerned about destruction of pastoralist homes. 10 April 2014. Available at: <http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14496&LangID=E>

armed forces, “mystic-religious” practices were used by recruiters to encourage youth to join: *gris-gris* amulets are offered which allegedly protect the fighter from harm, and virgins are promised to martyrs who die for the cause. Drugs are also widely used by recruiters to enhance these spiritual promises and practices.⁷²

c. Gender

Although Cameroon has ratified the major women’s rights instruments (including the 1981 Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, or CEDAW, in 1994, and the 1995 Beijing Platform), women’s social, economic, and political rights are not equal to men’s, particularly in rural areas. More than half of women over the age of 15 (55 percent) have experienced physical violence, 60 percent of those in marriage have experienced physical, sexual, or emotional violence, and 43 percent of those suffered injuries.⁷³ Although data are lacking, it is estimated that 13 percent of Cameroonian women have been sexually assaulted, and up to half a million raped per year.⁷⁴ Harmful practices such as breast ironing and female genital mutilation occur in almost every province. Although legal provisions exist to punish perpetrators of violence against women, they are poorly enforced (investigations and prosecutions of rape are rare) and many loopholes exist (for example if the perpetrator of rape marries his victim he is not prosecuted, and marital rape is not clearly defined).⁷⁵

The Minister of Women’s Affairs, in her 2013 statement at the UN Commission on the Status of Women, listed the following causes of violence against women: “customs and traditions that condone some specific cases of violence against women (husband’s right to beating, the practice of Female Genital Mutilation, early marriage, wife inheritance etc.), differentiation in the socialization of boys and girls, poor access to resources and lack of control over these resources, low representation of women in decision-making spheres, poverty, low level of education of women, and ignorance by these women of their rights and existing means of redress.”⁷⁶

Female refugees are particularly at risk of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) and other violations of human rights.⁷⁷ A quick impact assessment conducted in 2014 indicated that GBV was common in Gado

.....
More than half of women over the age of 15 have experienced physical violence.

72. Dynamique Mondiale des Jeunes (2015) L’enrôlement des jeunes dans les groups armes au Cameroun Service Civil pour la Paix, Dynamique Mondiale des Jeunes, October 2015 : Available at : http://www.peaceworkafrica.net/IMG/pdf/DMJ_Rapport_etude_enrolement_final_301115-2.pdf
73. Abena Ondoua, Pr., Minister of Women’s Empowerment and Family of the Republic of Cameroon (2013) Elimination and prevention of violence against women and girls: Statement at the 57th Session of the Commission on the Status of Women. New York: 5 March 2013. Available at <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/csw/csw57/generaldiscussion/memberstates/Cameroon.pdf>
74. The Advocates for Human Rights (2014) Written Statement to the 57th Session of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women. 24 January 2014. Available at: http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CEDAW/Shared_percent20Documents/CMR/INT_CEDAW_NGO_CMR_16206_E.pdf
75. The Advocates for Human Rights (2014) Written Statement to the 57th Session of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women. 24 January 2014. Available at: http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CEDAW/Shared_percent20Documents/CMR/INT_CEDAW_NGO_CMR_16206_E.pdf
76. Abena Ondoua, Pr., Minister of Women’s Empowerment and Family of the Republic of Cameroon (2013) Elimination and prevention of violence against women and girls: Statement at the 57th Session of the Commission on the Status of Women. New York: 5 March 2013. Page 3. Available at <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/csw/csw57/generaldiscussion/memberstates/Cameroon.pdf>
77. Nana-Dombe, P. (2014) Rapport de la mission d’observation sur la pratique de la prostitution de survie des Femmes et jeunes filles Centrafricaines à l’Est du Cameroun. (International Emergency and Development Aid) IEDA-Relief: December 2014.

camp and around Garoua-Boulai – refugee women were particularly vulnerable to violence (most often by Cameroonian men outside the camps, but also by men from CAR inside the sites) when collecting firewood or water, traveling outside the camp for business, or when using the latrines at night.⁷⁸ This study also found that services were inadequate for GBV survivors and did not meet minimum standards for humanitarian emergencies.

The prevalence of prostitution arose in interviews, especially in Garoua-Boulai. A study on prostitution in the East of Cameroon, conducted by IEDA-Relief, identified the following locations as having a high incidence of prostitution: Garoua-Boulai, Betare Oya, Ndokayo, Kette, Gbitti, Kentzou, Yokadouma and Libongo.⁷⁹ While this study found that most of the prostitutes were from CAR, there was also a substantial number of Cameroonian women; they were clustered in the commercial centers in particular and in some cases were involved in small business activity as a “cover” for prostitution. In areas of gold mining, both male and female youth were hired for the excavation and cleaning of gold, and then also became involved in prostitution, as well as other criminal activities such as drug trafficking. The facilitators of prostitution were often the owners of small guest houses and bars, or related to the artisanal gold mining industry: “cooking for the Chinese” was a reported euphemism for prostitution. The median age of the prostitutes interviewed was 24, ranging from 17 to 34 years. Forty-five out of 52 prostitutes interviewed had had at least 1 child and 65 percent had not finished or had never attended primary school. Most (98 percent) of the 52 had been raised by a single parent (most reported that at least one parent had been killed in the violence in CAR), and all were living in poverty. Most of the 52 interviewees said they were engaged in prostitution “voluntarily”, in order to make a living for themselves or their families. Several had been in early marriages arranged by their parents but had divorced after a few years. Various reasons for leaving CAR were cited, including fleeing insecurity (44 of the 52 left in 2013 fleeing Seleka forces, and 8 left for economic reasons) and the average length of time in Cameroon was 13 months. None of them had registered with UNHCR, saying they did not wish to live in the “enhanced sites”. Although prostitution is prohibited in the Criminal Code, with fines or 6 months in prison, the law has not been implemented. While prostitution in Cameroon is condemned in public discourse, in practice it is highly tolerated. However, the two key constraints that the interviewees reported were insufficient income and harassment by the Cameroonian security forces.

.....
Female genital mutilation or cutting (FGM/C) is still practiced in Cameroon, though the estimated incidence varies greatly in different reports.
.....

Female genital mutilation or cutting (FGM/C) is still practiced in Cameroon, though the estimated incidence varies greatly in different reports. While the WHO, UNICEF, and the government estimate only a 1-percent incidence of FGM/C of women aged 15 to 42 years, some report that the incidence may be much higher in rural areas and in some localities it is reported that 100 percent of girls are subjected to the practice.⁸⁰ A 2013 UNICEF report

78. Dargal, J.P. et al. (2014). Gender-based violence in Garoua-Boulai and Gado Refugee Camp: A rapid assessment by International Medical Corps, May 2014.

79. Nana-Dombe, P. (2014) Rapport de la mission d'observation sur la pratique de la prostitution de survie des Femmes et jeunes filles Centrafricaines à l'Est du Cameroun. (International Emergency and Development Aid) IEDA-Relief: December 2014.

80. Kindzeka, M.E. (2014) Cameroon, WHO Push for End to Female Circumcision. Voice of America: 17 June 2014. Available at: <http://www.voanews.com/content/cameroon-who-push-for-end-to-female-circumcision/1938703.html>; The Advocates for Human Rights (2014) Written statement to the 57th Session of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women. 24 January 2014. Available at: http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CEDAW/Shared_percept20Documents/CMR/INT_CEDAW_NGO_CMR_16206_E.pdf

estimated 1 percent of females in Cameroon and 24 percent in CAR were subjected to FGM/C, though the incidence was higher among Muslims (6 percent) and an unnamed ethnic group had the highest prevalence (13 percent). Three-quarters of girls and young women were cut between the ages of 5 and 15 years, with traditional practitioners conducting most of the practice. The area of greatest incidence was in the Extreme North.⁸¹ The practice is related to several factors: economic incentives for practitioners and reliance on traditional beliefs (such as FGM/C will make women more faithful, and if not practiced women may not bear children, get married, or be respected).

Early marriage is still an issue among both Cameroonians and refugees, especially in rural areas. By law, the legal age of marriage is 15 years for women and 18 for men and by law men are the head of the household and have the right to decide on the family home. Yet child marriage is still common, especially in traditional communities, though organizations such as UNICEF, the African Union, and the Cameroonian NGO Mboscuda have campaigns against it.⁸²

A land tenure ordinance was passed in 1974 which provides equal rights to all citizens; however, customary law often supersedes, negatively affecting the rights of women: while 80 percent of food needs were produced by women, women owned only 2 percent of the land.⁸³ Women are particularly vulnerable after the death of their husbands, and widows are sometimes required to marry a man in their deceased husband's family (which also results in decreasing her rights of inheritance). Occasionally, if a widow does not undertake widowhood rites, she may be accused of causing her husband's death.⁸⁴ Both male and female children have the right by law to inherit equally, whether married or not, but practice by customary law does not provide this right to females.⁸⁵

Some 11.2 percent of women are waged and salaried workers, and 28.6 percent of men, while unemployment figures are 5.1 percent for women and 3.7 percent for men.⁸⁶ Women have more difficulty obtaining credit and bank loans than men, often because their names are not on land titles so they lack collateral; women make up 37 percent of borrowers from micro-credit institutions. While women hold 14 percent of ministerial positions,⁸⁷ they hold only 23 out of 180 seats in the National Assembly, and only 1 in 23 presidential candidates in the 2011 presidential election was a woman.⁸⁸ At the local level, chieftaincies are all held by

.....
Early marriage is still an issue among both Cameroonians and refugees, especially in rural areas. Child marriage is still common, especially in traditional communities
.....

81. UNICEF (2013) Cameroon: Statistical profile on female genital mutilation/cutting. Available at: http://data.unicef.org/corecode/uploads/document6/uploaded_country_profiles/corecode/222/Countries/FGMC_CMCR.pdf

82. Van der Wolf, M. (2014) African Union starts campaign to curb child marriage. Voice of America: 28 May 2014. Available at: <http://www.voanews.com/content/african-union-starts-campaign-to-curb-child-marriage/1924614.html>

83. Ngala Killian Chintom (2012) Giving women land, giving them a future. Interpress Service News Agency. 16 October 2012. Available at: <http://www.ipsnews.net/2012/10/giving-women-land-giving-them-a-future/>

84. The Advocates for Human Rights (2014) Written statement to the 57th Session of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women. 24 January 2014. Available at: http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CEDAW/Shared_percent20Documents/CMR/INT_CEDAW_NGO_CMCR_16206_E.pdf

85. OECD Development Centre. Gender index. Social Institutions and Gender Index. Page 1. Available at: <http://www.genderindex.org/sites/default/files/datasheets/CM.pdf>

86. World Bank (2015) Gender Data Porta. Available at: <http://datatopics.worldbank.org/gender/country/cameroon>

87. World Bank (2015) Gender Data Porta. Available at: <http://datatopics.worldbank.org/gender/country/cameroon>

88. Global Conscience Initiative (2011) Gender equality in Cameroon: Political participation and leadership. <http://gci-cameroon.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Gender-Equality-in-Cameroon-2011.pdf>

men, and traditional councils are also almost entirely made up of men. Although occasionally a queen mother or female societies of elders may be involved in local governance, there is otherwise minimal female involvement in dispute resolution or decision-making.⁸⁹ Thus, particularly in rural areas, where customary law and practice predominate, women have minimal voice, resulting in economic inequality, lack of access to education, and lack of land rights.⁹⁰ These statistics indicate that both Cameroonian women and CAR refugee women's positions in society are far inferior to men's with far less access to, and control of, resources, as well as very little decision-making power. On the other hand, men, especially refugee men among the communities we focused upon in this study, were more likely to have been recruited to armed groups, and thus to have been attacked during the conflict in CAR.

d. Youth

A large proportion of the population is under 25 years of age (63 percent). While several articles in the popular press reported that the unemployment rate was very high at 30 percent, and many interviewees spoke about concerns about youth unemployment, other reliable sources (World Bank) stated that in fact unemployment was at 7 percent for males between 15 and 24, 8 percent for females, and 5 percent for the population in general (employment includes both the formal and informal sectors).⁹¹ However, as per the above economic section, *under*-employment is high, affecting the majority of youth, which may account for the perception of high unemployment. Literacy rates for youth aged 15 to 24 are high – 87 percent for males and 80 percent for females,⁹² but functional literacy is probably lower, and of those receiving higher education aiming for civil service sector jobs, few are successful.⁹³ Voter apathy among youth is high.⁹⁴ Only one study about drug and alcohol use in Cameroon was available, in which a psychologist reported that in a study of 1,200 high school students in Douala, 5 percent admitted to taking drugs (65 percent heroin, 57 percent cocaine, and 10 percent cannabis) while 75 percent had consumed alcohol.⁹⁵

.....
Under-employment is high, affecting the majority of youth, which may account for the perception of high unemployment.

While statistics about unemployment, literacy, and involvement in crime of refugee youth were not available, many interviewees spoke about (negative) perceptions of unemployed refugee youth including their drug and alcohol use, and fears of their negative influence on Cameroonian youth.

e. Mental health

Several interviewees spoke about the great hardships suffered by refugees reaching Cameroon. Refugees often arrived after weeks, or more often

89. Global Conscience Initiative (2011) Gender equality in Cameroon: Political participation and leadership. <http://gci-cameroon.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Gender-Equality-in-Cameroon-2011.pdf>

90. Global Conscience Initiative (2011) Gender equality in Cameroon: Political participation and leadership. <http://gci-cameroon.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Gender-Equality-in-Cameroon-2011.pdf>

91. Factsheet Cameroon. Youth policy: 30 June 2014. Available at: <http://www.youthpolicy.org/factsheets/country/cameroon/>

92. Factsheet Cameroon. Youth policy: 30 June 2014. Available at: <http://www.youthpolicy.org/factsheets/country/cameroon/>

93. Kindzeka, M.E. (2016) As Cameroon celebrates youth day, young people question future. Voice of America: 2 February 2016. Available at: <http://www.voanews.com/content/as-cameroon-celebrates-youth-day-young-people-question-future/3182931.html>

94. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (2016) Youth speak: Launch of poll on youth and politics in Cameroon. Available at: <http://www.fes-kamerun.org/fo/index.php/en/activities/64-les-jeunes-prennent-la-parole-lancement-de-lenquete-sur-les-jeunes-et-leur-participation-politique>

95. Endong, H. (2011) Stupéfiants: Douala laboratoire de la drogue au Cameroun. 3 August 2011 : Journal du Cameroun. Available at : <http://www.journalducameroun.com/article.php?aid=9483>

months, of travel in hiding, starving, having been attacked, injured, and with family members lost. Although statistics were not available for Cameroon, an MSF survey found that 8 percent of refugees fleeing CAR died before reaching Chad – 85 percent of those died in CAR before crossing the border (and of those, 87 percent were men who died from firearm, knife, or mortar attacks).⁹⁶ Due to the violence they had experienced and witnessed, many refugees were suffering from traumatic effects including pain, sleep problems, and loss of appetite.⁹⁷ Although some mental health services were available in some refugee areas, these were inconsistent and inadequate. Some organizations mentioned the importance of providing psycho-social support along with malnutrition care.⁹⁸

6. EXTERNAL INFLUENCES

In sharp contrast to CAR, Cameroon has not suffered as much at the hands of colonial powers, though Britain, Belgium, France and Germany all vied for position and resources. Cameroon has particularly close ties with France, including military, economic, and cultural agreements; however, a recent trip by French President François Hollande to Cameroon resulted in some negative press over economic ties, as well as rumors related to the French origin of weapons found in possession of Boko Haram.⁹⁹ Cameroon is very active in the United Nations (including its peacekeeping missions) and has close ties to the US and to Canada, as well as many African nations. There is also a large US Peace Corps presence (focusing on programs like HIV and AIDS, agriculture, etc.). Cameroon is a member of several multilateral organizations including Francophonie, The Commonwealth, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, the Group of 77, the Non-Aligned Movement, the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of Central African States.

Currently, Cameroon is in dispute over maritime borders and economic zones with neighboring Equatorial Guinea and Nigeria. On the other hand, it maintains good relations with Chad, CAR and DRC.

.....
Cameroon has not suffered as much at the hands of colonial powers, though Britain, Belgium, France and Germany all vied for position and resources.
.....

96. MSF (2014) Central African Refugees in Chad and Cameroon: "Suitcase or coffin". MSF: 16 July 2014. Available at: <http://www.msf.org/article/central-african-refugees-chad-and-cameroon-percentE2 percent80 percent9Csuitcase-or-coffin percentE2 percent80 percent9D>
This study also reported that many of the refugees in Cameroon came from western CAR (Bouar, Bossantélé, Bossangoa, Boda, Yaloké, and Baoro).

97. MSF (2014) Central African Refugees in Chad and Cameroon: "Suitcase or Coffin". MSF: 16 July 2014. Available at: <http://www.msf.org/article/central-african-refugees-chad-and-cameroon-percentE2 percent80 percent9Csuitcase-or-coffin percentE2 percent80 percent9D>

98. MSF (2014). Cameroon: Mental healthcare crucial for recovery of young CAR refugees. MSF: 4 December 2014. Available at: <http://www.msf.org.uk/article/cameroon-mental-healthcare-crucial-for-recovery-of-young-car-refugees>

99. Kindzeka, M.E. (2015) Hollande's Cameroon visit exacerbates anti-french sentiments. Voice of America: 1 July 2015. Available at: <http://www.voanews.com/content/hollande-cameroon-visit-exacerbates-anti-french-sentiments/2844257.html>

Conflict dynamics

In the CAF, conflict dynamics have been described thus: “The dynamics of conflict are shaped by how key actors mobilize the communal grievances and resiliencies found in all human social systems. Grievance and resilience emerge from an interaction between identity groups and institutional performance that produce enduring social patterns.”¹⁰⁰ After a review of the key issues discovered in the study (based upon the preliminary literature review, then upon key informant interviews and analysis), this section follows the structure of the CAF to discuss key actors, their grievances and identities, then institutional performance, social patterns, and resilience.

1. KEY ISSUES IN THE EAST

a. Introduction to the East Region¹⁰¹

Certain general key problems exist for the entire East Region – namely, resource and agro-pastoral conflicts, and insecurity. Based on information collected through our interviews, the influx of large groups of people in such a short time has put pressure on community resources like water, land and firewood, causing micro-conflicts over services like water-point placement, the utilization of land for farming, and the positioning of farmers in markets to sell their products. Transhumance routes and farmland are disputed, especially during the dry seasons. General criminality, violence, and aggression tied to the stigmatization of refugees plague those now cohabitating throughout this large expanse of land. For most of the region, however, conflict is also localized, given over to the key problems and actors particular to a community. For the purposes of response planning, therefore, it is important to recognize the characteristics individual to the three targeted locations and their surrounding communities.

.....
Certain general key problems exist for the entire East Region – namely, resource and agro-pastoral conflicts, and insecurity.
.....

Bertoua: The Bertoua zone is home to about 300,000 Cameroonians, as well as a refugee population of more than 17,000, while an even greater number of refugees is spread along axes between the three major zones identified here.¹⁰² This zone serves as a key hub connecting the central parts of the country to the rest of the East. It is home to the regional administration, and has several commercial areas attracting merchants from all over the East region. It is also located on the major thoroughfare connecting the Cameroon-CAR border to the Cameroonian political and financial capitals of Yaoundé and Douala, respectively.

Garoua-Boulai: This sector represents a key border access point between CAR and Cameroon. As such, a high volume of refugee traffic has passed through this point in addition to the day-to-day traversing that occurs for commerce and other work. The location houses more than 100,000 Cameroonians, while also playing host to two of the largest refugee locations in the entire East region – Garoua-Boulai proper and the

100. USAID (2012). Conflict Assessment Framework Application Guide. June 2012. Washington D.C.: USAID. Page 2. Available at: <https://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do/working-crises-and-conflict/technical-publications>
101. This section was written by Ian Proctor, CRS Cross-border Focal Point (consultant).
102. UNHCR Central African Republic Portal, figures current to 14 March 2016.

Gado-Badzere site, each of which has more than 20,000 people. In total, the refugee population here totals about 65,000 people.¹⁰³

Batouri: The area around Batouri is stretched along a wide expanse of Cameroon's shared border with CAR. It serves as a distribution hub for services on the axes from Ketté to Kentzou. While the area struggles with the problems associated with the influx of large numbers – it hosts three of the five major improved sites of Timangolo, Mbile, and Lolo. Batouri also faces the challenges of being close to the border, portions of which remain largely uncontrolled. In total, nearly 57,000 refugees live among an estimated local population of more than 112,000.

The following have been identified as key issues¹⁰⁴ in the East Region, which could lead to violent conflict between refugees and host communities, between refugees themselves, or within host communities: conflicts over local resources, agro-pastoral conflicts, and insecurity and crime:

b. Community-level conflicts over resources

The single most important issue related to violent conflict identified by interviewees is resource conflict (access to water, firewood, land, and services such as health, education, etc.).¹⁰⁵ Further complicating this primary resource conflict among Cameroonians is the refugee presence in the country, with resulting conflicts between refugees and host communities and between refugees and refugees (new versus old, Christian versus Muslim). The influx of this large number of refugees is putting great strain on existing resources, and both refugees and host communities are having to walk further to find water, land and firewood. Peoples' status as hosts, IDPs or refugees and grievances over real or perceived unequal assistance provided by UNHCR/NGOs exacerbate local resource pressures.

.....
The single most important issue related to violent conflict identified by interviewees is resource conflict (access to water, firewood, land, and services such as health, education, etc.).
.....

c. Agro-pastoral conflicts

Community-level conflicts over resources frequently arise in the context of the two main rural livelihoods of farming and cattle-raising. Although the seasonal movements of people (primarily Mbororo or Peuhl) with their livestock, known as transhumance, has been occurring for centuries across the region, recent population pressures and other changes have exacerbated the rate of conflicts. Several interviewees spoke about the massive impact the invasive Bokassa grass was having on the ability of herders to find edible grassland for their herds, which was also increasing the incidence of conflicts. Furthermore, with changing patterns of climate, migration, and conflict, these corridors have increasingly become targeted by bandits and kidnappers.

A recent study commissioned by UNHCR to examine the causes of and solutions to agro-pastoral conflicts in the North, Adamawa, and East Regions of Cameroon, and the impact of the refugees on these conflicts, indicated that while for many years the two groups had been living in harmony, recent conflicts were due to changing transhumance routes, an increase in the presence of weapons among pastoralists, and the increased

103. Ibid.

104. See Kossoumna Liba'a, N. (2015) Etude sur les Conflits Agro-Pastoraux dans les Régions Camerounaises du Nord, Adamaoua et Est : Rapport Final. Lutheran World Federation (Commissioned by UNHCR): December 2015. Page 38.

105. This extensive study also identifies land and resource conflict (as related to agro-pastoral conflict) as a primary risk of conflict : Kossoumna Liba'a, N. (2015) Etude sur les Conflits Agro-Pastoraux dans les Régions Camerounaises du Nord, Adamaoua et Est : Rapport Final. Lutheran World Federation (Commissioned by UNHCR): December 2015.

numbers of roadblocks (*coupeurs des routes* or “road cutting”¹⁰⁶).¹⁰⁷ The study goes on to say that the pressure on pastoral lands was huge, with the arrival of the hundreds of thousands of refugees, some of whom had come with their animals. Such a large influx resulted in a disruption of the entire livestock and agricultural sector, hence an increase in the incidence of conflict. The types of conflicts found included those between farmers and pastoralists; traditional authorities and farmers or with youth; humanitarian aid agencies and traditional chiefs, and with refugees; between refugees and local authorities, improve site administrators, and security forces; between old and new refugees and between refugees in the sites.¹⁰⁸ These conflicts have also been found in this SCA.

As mentioned elsewhere, the study found that the increased presence of Muslim communities was causing concern among local communities (Gbaya in particular) that the political make-up of the area would be disrupted in future elections. The study also noted that younger people may have more violent responses to these historical conflicts than their elders.

More attention is being paid recently to the issue of pastoralism and increasing agro-pastoral conflicts: a conference on security challenges in West and Central Africa concluded that the system was under threat and that governments and civil society should be directly involved in peacebuilding efforts and conflict prevention.¹⁰⁹

Cameroonian interviewees raised concerns that unregulated herds from CAR had not been vaccinated and had thus caused livestock deaths in Cameroon. Several also noted that Mbororo and Peuhl communities had been crossing borders in the East for many years and that many families were related across these borders. A new development was noted in that some pastoral movements may be increasingly moving westwards towards Yaoundé due to the population pressures increasing in the east.

Insecurity and crime

An issue of concern to all interviewees was security (robbery and theft, assault, rape, and generalized violence, as well as banditry, trans-border crimes, kidnapping, and “road cutting”), which is linked to stigmatization of refugees. Some theft of crops was attributed to refugees when they first came to Cameroon, but several interviewees described this as understandable and done in order to survive. Other robbery and theft was attributed to youth, especially those using drugs, and sometimes refugee youth were seen as more likely to undertake such crimes. The more serious crimes of assault and violence were said to occur at water points, and during other arguments over resources (especially between refugees and host communities).

.....
An issue of concern to all interviewees was security (robbery and theft, assault, rape, and generalized violence, as well as banditry, trans-border crimes, kidnapping, and “road cutting”).
.....

106. “Road cutting” is the translation from French of the acts carried out by “road-blocking bandits” who block roads to loot the vehicles they stop: “les coupeurs de routes”. See for example Harding, A. (2014) Central African Republic’s road to anarchy. 24 July 2014: BBC. Available at: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-28461875>

107. Kossoumna Liba’a, N. (2015) Etude sur les Conflits Agro-Pastoraux dans les Régions Camerounaises du Nord, Adamaoua et Est : Rapport Final. Lutheran World Federation (Commissioned by UNHCR): December 2015. Page 11.

108. Kossoumna Liba’a, N. (2015) Etude sur les Conflits Agro-Pastoraux dans les Régions Camerounaises du Nord, Adamaoua et Est : Rapport Final. Lutheran World Federation (Commissioned by UNHCR): December 2015. Page 38.

109. Government of Nigeria, Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) (2014) International Conference on Security and Development Challenges of Pastoralism in West And Central Africa: Final Communiqué. Available at: http://www.iwgia.org/iwgia_files_news_files/1060_INTERNATIONAL_CONFERENCE_ON_PASTORALISTS_SECURITY_AND_DEVELOPMENT_-_FINAL_COMMUNIQUE.pdf

Assault, rape, and other violent acts, including kidnapping and road cutting, were attributed to usually unknown and unnamed armed groups, though sometimes the instigators were assumed to be from CAR (in general, or to be Seleka or anti-balaka) or from Chad; most interviewees were hesitant to name anyone in these crimes. In 2014, the area around Garoua-Boulai in eastern Cameroon was battered by the war spillover from CAR. With bullets flying across the border, trade was severely limited and the all-important supply trucks for Bangui had to be escorted by international military forces.¹¹⁰ In May 2014, eight of twenty people who had been kidnapped by (ex)Seleka rebels were freed by Cameroonian troops who had crossed the border to free the hostages.¹¹¹ In January 2015, CAR rebel groups were pushed back into CAR by the Cameroonian military, and the Mayor of Lagdo was kidnapped near Yokossiré.¹¹² In March 2015, 15 people, including local government officials, were kidnapped near Garoua-Boulai and taken to CAR. It was suspected that the culprits were supporters of rebel leader Abdoulaye Miskine hoping to obtain his release from custody in CAR. Another incident relayed by several interviewees was the assault of the police chief in Garoua-Boulai in which he lost an arm trying to break up a fight between refugees.

.....
Assault, rape, and other violent acts, including kidnapping and road cutting, were attributed to usually unknown and unnamed armed groups, though sometimes the instigators were assumed to be from CAR or Chad.

Several Cameroonian interviewees repeated a rumor that when refugees were found guilty of crimes they were released from jail by UNHCR. No statistics on crimes in the East were available.¹¹³

e. Ethnic/religious conflict and refugee/host conflict

Underlying all the above three priority issues that could lead to conflict, are the identities of the various groups – either ethnic or religious identities, or related to their status as refugees or host communities. The conflicts between refugee and host communities are discussed above and were usually over resources such as water points or firewood. Many Cameroonian interviewees spoke about their views that refugees were receiving vast amounts of aid, while local communities were not – these views led to feelings of resentment. They also complained that the refugees were cutting excess wood, often for sale, requiring host communities to walk further. In the UNHCR study, interviewees complained of refugees not cleaning private and public spaces, and defecating in the open.¹¹⁴ Some interviewees could see that refugees could also bring benefits to certain villages through the presence of small commerce, butchers, and infrastructure including schools, water points, and food aid – viewpoints echoed in the UNHCR agro-pastoral research.¹¹⁵

110. Agence France-Presse (China Daily) (2014) Cameroon border city battered by crisis in C. Africa. AFP (China Daily) updated 20 March 2014. Available at: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2014-03/20/content_17363131.htm

111. Kindzeka, M.E. (2014) Cameroon blames Seleka rebels for hostage taking. Voice of America: 15 May 2014. Available at: <http://www.voanews.com/content/cameroon-blames-seleka-rebels-for-hostage-taking/1915113.html>

112. Kossoumna Liba'a, N. (2015) Etude sur les Conflits Agro-Pastoraux dans les Régions Camerounaises du Nord, Adamaoua et Est : Rapport Final. Lutheran World Federation (Commissioned by UNHCR) : December 2015.

113. See extensive reporting on crimes in Cameroon in general (but not the specifically the East): US State Department Overseas Security Advisory Council (2015) Cameroon 2015 Crime and Safety Report. Available at: <https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=17681>
<https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=17681>

114. Kossoumna Liba'a, N. (2015) Etude sur les Conflits Agro-Pastoraux dans les Régions Camerounaises du Nord, Adamaoua et Est : Rapport Final. Lutheran World Federation (Commissioned by UNHCR) : December 2015. Page 28.

115. Kossoumna Liba'a, N. (2015) Etude sur les Conflits Agro-Pastoraux dans les Régions Camerounaises du Nord, Adamaoua et Est : Rapport Final. Lutheran World Federation (Commissioned by UNHCR) : December 2015. Page 27.

Conflicts between ethnic groups are reported to be primarily between those who are predominantly either Christian or Muslim – specifically between the Mbororo or Peuhl, and between various predominantly Christian ethnic groups such as Gbaya. Although Muslim Mbororo and primarily Christian Gbaya often live side by side, and even move as refugees together, there were several incidents of serious conflict reported between them. One grievance reported by Christian groups was that the Gbaya convert to Islam relatively easily, resulting in resentment by other Christian groups, as well as among the Gbaya Christians themselves. One particular story was related by several interviewees, all of whom had varying interpretations of the culprit: the majority groups accused an Mbororo youth of killing a Gbaya youth in Mandjou, while the Mbororo said another Gbaya youth was responsible. Existing conflict between Fulani and Gbaya has been exacerbated by the arrival of refugees due to competition over resources. Some refugees complained that they are willing to work but that the local Gbaya farmers refuse to hire them.

.....
Conflicts between ethnic groups are reported to be primarily between those who are predominantly either Christian or Muslim.
.....

Between refugees of different waves (earlier Christian refugees versus newer Muslim refugees), one specific incident reported involved women arguing at a water point and accusing each other of being anti-balaka or Seleka.

f. Location-specific issues¹¹⁶

In the capital of the region, Bertoua, and its neighboring communities – places like Mandjou, Boulembe, and Bazzama – interviewees especially noted the interpersonal religious disputes that seem to have come over with the refugees and mixed with extant religious differences in Cameroon. While contained, these religious differences sometimes manifest themselves in incidents between members of two different faith groups, especially among young members of these societies. Youth here are grappling with high unemployment as new people are entering the labor force while employment opportunities have not yet grown to keep pace. Especially in a regional capital like Bertoua, among a Cameroonian population that tends to be educated and qualified, refugees are unable to compete in the formal labor economy. Social services also do not have the capacity to accommodate such a large group of young people, particularly away from more urban centers in villages surrounding Bertoua. For example, schools have a problem recruiting, retaining, and paying teacher salaries. With this lack of social service capacity, certain young people are forced to resort to crime and other delinquency in order to support themselves.

Stigmatization based on religion and closely associated with refugee status was particularly important to those interviewed in the Garoua-Boulaiï region. Refugees grappled with identity issues while also facing an accompanying problem of official registration and inability to obtain documentation. The process of registration and concerns around movement result in many refugees pursuing unofficial or illegal documents – identity cards and other fraudulent forms – in order to travel and work. At the same time, the population, especially the youth of both refugee and local communities, are engaged in several sorts of dangerous practices for lack of better economic opportunity, including the consumption of drugs – namely Traumol, the street-named version of the opioid pain medication Tramadol – and the practice of transactional sex and prostitution. Young women and girls, often with low or no formal

116. This section was written by Ian Proctor.

education, find jobs hard to come by in the Cameroonian workforce. Sex work makes them vulnerable to exploitation and criminal malfeasance, and also to health risks in a system already struggling to support the medical and sanitation needs of the refugee population.

The insecurity of the Batouri region manifests itself in different, yet compounding ways, from kidnapers and armed groups operating across the border, to road cutters and illegal road blocks, to theft and armed banditry. This possibly stems from a limited span of control by local and national security forces over such an expanse of land. On top of insecurity concerns endemic to the region, these problems of distance and control account for the high level of insecurity particular to Batouri. A pervading sense of intolerance also afflicts both local and refugee communities, stemming from residual grievances in CAR and the stigmatization of refugee status. Mindset holdovers from the political conflict in CAR that was mobilized through religious identity couple with nascent prejudices around Cameroonian in-group and Central African refugee out-grouping. In addition, drug consumption continues to be a problem for communities trying to engage youth despite a lack of economic opportunity. Drugs, made available because of the long commerce routes and the insecure environment, remain a concern for community leadership in many localities.

2. KEY ISSUES AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL

The following have been identified as key issues at the national level, which could lead to violent conflict:

a. Uncertainty over national-level leadership

President Paul Biya, now 83 years old, has been in power for decades, and to date has managed to balance the multiplicity of ethnic and regional differences to maintain a relatively peaceful Cameroon. However, his management style continues to be highly individualized and secretive, and as a succession plan has not been publicized, there are fears that in the case of his inability to continue as president, a power vacuum could result, with instability and resultant power struggles. As a result of a management style that is maintained through personal and family ties across ministries, businesses, regions, and the military, a lack of cohesion between the center and the regions and between regions could exacerbate potential power shifts. Ambitious political figures could try to capitalize on a change of power and mobilize key groups (ethnic or religious groups, or generalized groups such as youth/students or motorcycle-taxi drivers) to create instability or violent conflict.

.....
As a succession plan for President Paul Biya has not been publicized, there are fears that in the case of his inability to continue as president, a power vacuum could result, with instability and resultant power struggles.
.....

b. Terrorism (Boko Haram)

At the national level, interviewees and the literature focused on the many terrorist attacks, mainly in the North, attributed to Boko Haram, and the medium to high risk of such attacks happening elsewhere in Cameroon. Although the government seems to be taking measures to reduce the chance of infiltration of terrorist groups, due to the conflict in the North, the government has reduced military forces in the East, making it more vulnerable to possible events of violence.

Many local-level interviewees spoke of their strong disagreement with the messages of Boko Haram (as being against Islam), and several Muslim groups (such as the Conseil Supérieur Islamique and the NGO Mboscuda) are actively working against the premises of Boko Haram and working towards secular education of young Muslims (both boys and girls). Thus local groups are actively working against this possible conflict dynamic.

c. Youth disenfranchisement

In most conflict analyses, youth, especially disenfranchised and unemployed youth, are variously described as important figures in the context of conflict, possible 'recruitment' communities, or key actors for conflict. In Cameroon, there was widespread concern that youth unemployment or disenfranchisement could lead to instability in the country, though no report or interviewee felt that youth as a mass movement would rise up and either create massive violent conflict or political instability. A complicating factor most often mentioned was related to the large presence of refugees; in the East in particular, where refugee youth were seen as exacerbating the problems of unemployment, of promoting drug use, and corrupting local youth, resulting in increased crime.

.....
Youth, especially disenfranchised and unemployed youth, are variously described as important figures in the context of conflict, possible 'recruitment' communities, or key actors for conflict.
.....

d. General and cross-cutting issues

Various other issues arose from the literature review, but interviewees did not prioritize them. These included intergenerational conflict, leadership conflict, human rights abuses by government officials, and gender issues previously described in the context section.

Intergenerational conflict was reported to occur most often between the elder traditionalists and younger generations more attuned to social media and globalization. In the Muslim communities, intergenerational tensions may occur between the older conservatives and the younger generation who may be more likely to support the more radical Wahhabism. ICG reported that young Muslims from the South more often spoke Arabic, had been educated in Sudan or Gulf States, and were leading the promotion of Wahhabism. These conflicts based on ideology also touch economic and political leadership within the Muslim communities.¹¹⁷

Also in the literature were reports of the mistreatment of refugees by Cameroonian authorities - in our interviews this was occasionally mentioned by refugees but was not a predominant complaint. Refugees more often reported difficulties with authorities when they tried to leave improved sites, or travel outside of home villages.

3. KEY ACTORS

a. Politico-military groups and leaders: Key actors for conflict

Although in Cameroon, the majority of the interviewees or reports were not able to identify specific key mobilizers of conflict, the shadowy 'various armed groups' (often linked to ex-Seleka and anti-balaka), were mentioned as provoking criminality. Many feared these attacks could lead to more widespread community violence, as communities and local authorities are tired of being victims. Cameroonian Government officials expressed great displeasure at attacks from CAR armed groups that had crossed their borders. Abdoulaye Miskine was mentioned by several interviewees as a conflict actor who was reported to be moving freely in Garoua-Boulai.

b. Moto-taxi drivers: Recruitment community

During the 2008 demonstrations over rising prices, moto-taxi drivers

117. ICG (2015) Cameroon: The threat of religious radicalism. Africa Report N°229 | 3 September 2015. Available at: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/-/media/Files/africa/central-africa/229-cameroon-the-threat-of-religious-radicalism.pdf>

played a crucial role in blocking roads and other forms of protest. They are all male and most are young. In the East, many refugees have joined the ranks of moto-taxi drivers. There is a Syndicate of Moto-Taxi drivers which speaks for their rights. While interviewees did not suggest that moto-taxi drivers would create or exacerbate conflict, there were concerns that, in the case of widespread political instability, they could be recruited by unscrupulous politicians.

c. Religious leaders and groups: Key actors for peace¹¹⁸

The primary groups or individuals clearly identified as acting for peace in Cameroon were certain religious leaders and groups. In particular, Catholics were identified as most often initiating activities related to peacebuilding. This predominance by Catholics was attributed to their internal structures and hierarchies (in contrast to the Protestants and Muslims who have no such overarching organizational structures), as well as to the presence of the various justice and peace committees at local parishes and at the national level. In addition, the Catholic organization ACADIR (Association Camerounaise pour le Dialogue Interreligieux) has the mission of promoting interreligious peacebuilding and dialogue in the country, and it has conducted a variety of meetings and events, such as creating a day of 'religions' during which the various religious groups prayed in honor of the victims of terrorism in Cameroon.¹¹⁹

.....
The primary groups or individuals clearly identified as acting for peace in Cameroon were certain religious leaders and groups.
.....

CEPCA, or the Conseil des Eglises Protestantes du Cameroun, is a coalition group of Protestant churches, though due to the wide variety of faiths, the network is loose and simply serves as a coordination and communication body. Although the Secretary General said in an interview that the majority of its members also had activities related to peace, there was no sub-group mentioned on their website; however, the slogan for the CEPCA 49th celebration of the Youth Day was for the preservation of peace. For example, he said that they organized and participated in a prayer day for peace against terrorism. A previous interview with another staff member of CEPCA covered some activities targeting youth, including youth and employment days, as well as platforms to connect youth with local leadership.

Muslim groups are also involved in peacebuilding activities, for example the Conseil Superior Islamique was identified as the major group promoting peace and interreligious harmony, and the Conseil des Imams et Dignitaires Musulmans (CIDIMUC) participated in the aforementioned day of religions. In our interviews with the Conseil Superior Islamique in Bertoua and Yaoundé, members described many activities they were arranging towards peace and interreligious harmony, including Friday prayers, radio and TV speeches and prayers, and participation in several other meetings and activities with ACADIR and the various Catholic groups.

A small sub-group of Pentecostal or Revivalist churches or pastors can be seen as an actor for division, rather than for peace – several interviewees spoke of the divisive language of intolerance preached by some of these church groups, many of which sprout up in private homes and are unregulated. This finding was echoed in ICG's research.¹²⁰

118. See the following websites: <http://www.cepca-protestant.org/>

119. Camerpost (2016) ACADIR : Le Cameroun crée une « journée des religions ». 1 January 2016. Available at : <http://www.camerpost.com/acadir-le-cameroun-cree-une-journee-des-religions/>

120. ICG (2015) Cameroon: The threat of religious radicalism. Africa Report N°229 | 3 September 2015. Available at: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/-/media/Files/africa/central-africa/229-cameroon-the-threat-of-religious-radicalism.pdf>

d. Certain traditional leaders and local authorities

Traditional leaders and local authorities were also regularly cited as contributing to conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Although not all of them were given as examples, many were seen as a strong force for peace. Certain local authorities included refugees in committees, including the “Vigilance Committees” created to maintain security in the community. Although not all local leaders included refugees in their leadership structures, there were some innovative ways found for refugee and local leaders to maintain peaceful relations.

e. Women

Women in general were identified as a group that was more often promoting peace – there were several anecdotes reported where women took the first step towards peace and reconciliation, or women brought their husbands towards peace. One international organization staff person mentioned a case in CAR where Peuhl women had opened a market on the edge of an enclave so that the communities could have access to each other’s products. An initiative entitled “Queen for Peace” was organized by the NGO Women in Alternative Action (WAA) in 2012, bringing 100 wives of traditional leaders (queens) together from 10 regions for advocacy to reduce violence against women, and to build their capacity, “because of the traditional authority vested in them, their position beside traditional rulers as counselors and conveyers of positive values and also because they are listened to by the kings.”¹²¹

On the other hand, the role of women as peacebuilders was not a universal finding, as when asked about disputes or conflict at the community level, several were within or between women’s groups.

f. Certain national and international NGOs and international organizations (actors for conflict and for peace)

Many international organizations and NGOs were described as being actors for peace, and interviewees felt that refugees and host communities alike would be in a much worse condition without these actors. Not only have these organizations responded to sector-based needs like shelter or food security, but many interviewees also cited the work of organizations like the UNHCR, PLAN, Première Urgence, ACF, and CARE in Timangolo, putting in place management committees for conflict and advancing the capacity of youth to organize around social cohesion activities. UN Women’s work with local women’s groups in the Gado-Badzere camp was cited by a couple of interviewees, covering accompaniment of women and girls, particularly during marriages and for advancing cooperation across gender groups.

On the other hand, some organizations were cited as acting for conflict. There were quite a few complaints about NGOs and the UNHCR unfairly distributing goods or services, and not adequately consulting with communities. A few interviewees complained that MSF had built a special wing for refugees at the hospital which was much better than the services for local people. Although these complaints could not be investigated within the context of this study, it seems clear that at least some of these complaints were unfounded and based upon unjustified perceptions of unfair treatment of host communities compared with that

Case study: In 2003, in one village of about 5,000 local people and 600 Mbororo refugees, the traditional (Gbaya) leader welcomed the refugees and arranged to provide them with land when they arrived (for which they paid). This chief had died and his son was continuing this local arrangement of welcome and, in this village, relationships seemed warm, though somewhat distant. The traditional chief in the refugee village also made great efforts to come and see the Gbaya chief almost daily, to maintain close relations. The Gbaya chief told us of another incident between himself and some local herders (non-refugee) who had trampled 6 hectares of his corn that was almost ready to harvest. He said he ignored this incident, as he wanted to maintain peace in the village.

121. Abena Ondoua, Pr., Minister of Women’s Empowerment and Family of the Republic of Cameroon, (2013) Elimination and prevention of violence against women and girls: Statement at the 57th Session of the Commission on the Status of Women. New York: 5 March 2013. Available at: <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/csw/csw57/generaldiscussion/memberstates/Cameroon.pdf>

of refugees, and lack of information about procedures of NGOs and IOs. Nonetheless, these perceptions are widespread, susceptible to rumor, and can also influence the creation of violent conflict.

4. GRIEVANCES

Generalized grievances were expressed by all interviewees against the armed groups that were committing crimes against both refugee and host community communities. Another key grievance cited by the majority of Cameroonian interviewees was against the refugees whom they felt were receiving more aid from international organizations than host communities were receiving. Cameroonians also felt that CAR refugees were too quick to anger, and did not respect local laws or authorities – the grievance being that they respected laws and the refugees should also. These community-level grievances were often sparked by conflicts over resources such as water points, firewood, or schools. Both refugee and host communities expressed grievances against youth who were involved in drugs and crime.

Several interviewees spoke about the relative lack of development in the East, an underlying grievance that could contribute to instability there, especially in light of the large influx of refugees putting great pressure on diminishing resources. Although the East remains relatively weak in comparison to the rest of the country’s development, the area continues to slowly improve with some new roads recently built or under construction, and some small development projects.

Both Muslim and Christian refugees spoke of grievances against those who had evicted them from their homes, destroyed their property, and injured or killed their families.

.....
Both Muslim and Christian refugees spoke of grievances against those who had evicted them from their homes, destroyed their property, and injured or killed their families.
.....

5. IDENTITIES

Various identities have been identified in this SCA: ethnic (Bamileke, Bassa, Fulbe, Gbaya, Hausa, Kako, Maka, Mbororo, Peuhl, as well as other ethnic groups); religious (Catholic, Christian, Protestant, Adventist/Evangelical/Pentecostal, Muslim, animist); age groups (youth, middle-aged, elders); gender (women, men); armed groups; and political groups (ruling political party RDPC of President Paul Biya, or apolitical). While we were able to draw some conclusions about certain groups (particularly the Mbororo, Peuhl and Gbaya ethnic groups, as well as the religious groups, gender, and age factors) we lacked information on the other ethnic groups and political groups – it was quite sensitive to ask interviewees their ethnic or political group, so some information is lacking.

6. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE

As defined in the CAF: “Institutional performance refers to the extent to which formal and informal institutions produce outcomes that members of society consider to be legitimate and/or effective.”¹²² In contrast to CAR where most of the formal and informal institutions at the local level are seen as illegitimate, ineffective, or entirely absent, in Cameroon, many local institutions were seen as operating fairly well.

122. USAID (2012) Conflict Assessment Framework: Version 2.0. June 2012. Washington D.C.: USAID. Page 20. Available at: <https://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do/working-crises-and-conflict/technical-publications>

These local institutions include the police, military, traditional leaders, and local authorities. Most interviewees, as well as some studies, noted the strong institutional performance of the armed forces in their ability to maintain peace and security – besides the military, the BIR, the police, the gendarmes, and the Vigilance Committees were seen as strong and effective. However, some interviewees expressed concern that, with the current terrorist threat, specifically Boko Haram, in the North with greater deployments there, that security forces in the East were stretched thin, and these gaps (both in numbers and in competence) created a greater risk for the potential spread of violent conflict in the East. These risks were exacerbated by the porous nature of the long border, with many areas inaccessible, especially in the Southeast – security breaches by armed groups from CAR and Cameroon were of great concern to many.

In our interviews, there was minimal mention of the court system at the local level. However, most interviewees, both Cameroonian and refugee, complained about the inadequate health systems and schools; Cameroonian interviewees felt that services for refugees were better than those for host communities. At the national level, widespread corruption of ministries and departments was seen as a major problem, as was the corruption of local authorities – particularly related to giving ID cards to refugees.

Traditional, religious, and community leaders, and local authorities play a key role in resolving conflict and promoting social cohesion. Local committees' roles in decision-making and conflict management were also seen positively, including those to manage water resources, mixed refugee-host community groups (specifically created to address their issues), security (vigilance) committees, etc. While most of the committees created or facilitated by UNHCR or NGOs included women participants, the government-sponsored committees had few or no women, especially the security committees (which were usually made up of the men who were responsible for patrolling the villages). In some locations, there were regular meetings between the local and traditional authorities and refugee leaders to discuss local issues, again seen as positive. Several NGOs, either independently or under UNHCR-funded programs, had created various local committees to manage various services – in particular for water (dams and wells) and for the enhanced sites. Institutional performance was enhanced in certain locations when refugees and Cameroonians were both recruited by NGOs to act as community development agents. Social cohesion was further enhanced when certain NGOs (such as CARE, and now CRS) had specific activities to promote social cohesion, or integrate social cohesion into their other activities.

As mentioned elsewhere, the religious leaders, through the institutions of churches, mosques, and CDJP, play an important role in dispute resolution and promoting social cohesion. Unfortunately, few specific examples were relayed.

State structures and legal instruments concerning refugees are in place, but not fully implemented. A Refugee Law which provides for the protection of refugees was passed in 2005, and a decree to apply the law was signed in 2011 setting up various governmental bodies to do so. An Eligibility and Appeals Commission was created in 2012. While there are many informal platforms for refugees and host communities to meet, and some local authorities and traditional chiefs have integrated refugees into

.....
Traditional, religious, and community leaders, and local authorities play a key role in resolving conflict and promoting social cohesion.
.....

their decision-making and security bodies, there is no formal mechanism to include refugee voices in Cameroon, nor to promote communication and social cohesion between the groups.

The creation of various associations related to agriculturists and herders was pointed out by several interviewees as an important tool to defend the various interests of the groups, and to work towards resolving conflicts between them. The NGO Mboscuda, working for the rights of Mbororo communities, was mentioned by many. In addition, the presence of government Department of Agriculture staff in several prefectures was noted to be a very positive development to reduce the incidence of crop destruction by herds, and reduce tensions between farmers and herders (for example in Garga Sarali).

7. SOCIAL PATTERNS

Healthy social patterns as defined in the CAF may include “those that support rule of law, social mobility, freedom of expression, the forging of inclusive political coalitions, and expansive or pluralist notions of identity and nationhood” which “all play a role in bolstering resilience to violence” – “when the institutions of society perform in ways that key identity groups consider to be legitimate and effective, then conflict-mitigating social patterns may emerge”.¹²³

a. Positive social patterns

Remarkable acceptance of refugees by host communities in the past

Many interviewees commented on the quite remarkable fact that refugees had been relatively well-accepted in CAR by host communities for many years. This social pattern of acceptance and welcome was seen as a great strength of the Cameroonian people, as many refugees were accepted into homes of people they did not know. The hospitality often took place on the basis of an ethnic or religious grouping (i.e. Mbororo welcomed Peuhl/Mbororo, Gbaya welcomed Gbaya – but some intra-group welcoming also occurred). Also remarkable was the understanding exhibited by several interviewees that some refugees had to resort to theft of agricultural produce when they had first arrived, given their starved and traumatized state. However, this acceptance has worn thin over the years, especially with the perception that refugees received assistance and free rice every month while host communities did not. Some host communities said they would not welcome any more refugees.

.....
Refugees have been relatively well-accepted in CAR by host communities for many years.
.....

A positive social pattern was observed in several locations whereby refugees were involved in conflict resolution and the search for peace. This was especially prevalent in locations where refugees had been integrating into the community throughout the different waves. In Giwa Yangamo, for example, several female refugees discussed their participation in the women’s and mixed associations, which host tontines (commong funds) that encourage the different communities – Christian refugees, Muslim refugees, and locals of both faiths – to integrate. The refugee and local traditional leadership in Ketté and Lolo regularly involved each other in decision making, selecting members of their communities for committees covering different communal concerns.

123. USAID (2012) Conflict Assessment Framework: Version 2.0. June 2012. Washington D.C.: USAID. Page 16, 25. Available at: <https://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do/working-crises-and-conflict/technical-publications>

b. Negative social patterns

Corruption

The CAF identified five negative social patterns that commonly result in grievances in conflict-affected states: elitism, exclusion, chronic capacity deficits, transitional moments, and corruption. Only corruption was identified by interviewees as an important issue. Corruption (among government, traditional and administrative authorities, etc.) is widespread in Cameroon, and this issue was mentioned by most interviewees who spoke of corruption in many walks of life. A large anti-corruption project called “Education for Integrity” started by CRS as a successful pilot was expanded to all private schools: unfortunately, only 2 of 5 years were completed (due to missing funds after the second year). Another “Stop Corruption” project has been quietly undertaken with the involvement of the Service National Justice et Paix (SNJP) but corruption is still considered a major problem in the country.

Youth unemployment

Youth unemployment and underemployment were seen as key problems for both Cameroonian and refugee communities. Though statistics were not available for refugee youth, in Cameroon the unemployment rates for youth are 7 percent for males and 8 percent for females, and 5 percent for the general population. These are relatively low, though as mentioned above, this statistic includes both the formal and informal sectors, and most youth are underemployed. However, almost every interviewee spoke of the importance of youth, especially disenfranchised and unemployed youth, as potential actors for conflict (or for peace) in Cameroon. There were few research studies available about either refugee or Cameroonian youth. The notable exception was a 2015 study on the enrollment of youth in armed groups – triggered by the upsurge of violence related to terrorism (Boko Haram) in the north of the country as well as the insecurity in the East due to the conflict in CAR.¹²⁴ This study identified youth as being between 10 and 35 years of age, and included interviews in Bertoua and Garoua-Boulai in the East (34 female and 108 male), as well as interviews in four other regions and the center (Yaoundé). Seven major trends were identified in the study: 1) in spite of prejudices against Islam, religion was not seen as a primary factor in the decision to join armed groups; 2) most youth were strongly dissatisfied with the State, and felt excluded – and 75 percent of the respondents felt that bad governance was the main cause of the creation of the armed groups; 3) in spite of previous finding related to bad governance, youth nonetheless felt confident that the Cameroonian Armed Forces respond to the threats of the armed groups; 4) rumors play an important role in recruitment to armed groups, and these promises of a bright future are exaggerated by the media; 5) although money was identified as an important recruitment tool, more important were the issues of marginalization, and exclusion (political or religious) – the root causes of youth joining armed groups were difficult living conditions, difficulty finding jobs, and low wages; 6) different responses were gathered from urban versus rural youth –

.....
In spite of prejudices against Islam, religion was not seen as a primary factor in the decision to join armed groups.
.....

124. Dynamique Mondiale des Jeunes (2015) L'enrolement des jeunes dans les groupes armes au Cameroun Service Civil pour la Paix, Dynamique Mondiale des Jeunes, October 2015 : Available at : http://www.peaceworkafrica.net/IMG/pdf/DMJ_Rapport_etude_enrolement_final_301115-2.pdf

rural youth were seen to be more pragmatic, yet more vulnerable;¹²⁵ and, 7) while recruiters were said to use mystical/religious myths to attract followers, it was not clear if this tactic was effective.

Exclusion of youth and women from decision-making

While it is not a new issue in Cameroon, several interviewees and the literature indicated that youth and women were often excluded from decision-making of all kinds. This exclusion, particularly of youth, can give rise to grievances leading to conflict.

Sectarianism and radicalization of some Muslims (refugees and local)

Several (primarily non-Muslim) interviewees expressed concern that both refugee and host community Muslims (Mbororo, Peuhl, and others) had recently become more radicalized and some were pushing certain forms of Islam, namely Wahhabism, on others. Several interviewees expressed concern about the role of outside actors, in particular Saudi Arabia, in this reported Islamization. Local communities seem to be linking religious radicalism to the high number of Muslim refugees and are increasingly distrustful of refugees since the advent of terrorism, the presence of Boko Haram, and the increase in crime in border areas.

Weak civil society

One striking finding in Cameroon was the dearth of civil society organizations. Only a handful were identified as working towards peacebuilding, and those references were often circular and led back to a few key individuals active in this area. Several interviewees felt that civil society leadership suffered from a lack of vision, competition over funding, and lack of commitment to truly assisting society or to social change, instead exhibiting a focus on personal gain. Several had been accused of corruption. There was some concern that civil society leaders could be co-opted or threatened by government powers if they dared to speak out too openly: for example, when Professor Pierre Titi, the former Director of the SNJP spoke out against the electoral irregularities, SNJP was identified as a 'stone in the shoe' of the government.¹²⁶ Nevertheless, there are a handful of civil society organizations very actively working towards peace, social cohesion, and human rights.

.....
One striking finding in Cameroon was the dearth of civil society organizations.
.....

c. Positive/negative

Ethnic solidarity

Ethnic solidarity was noted among some ethnic groups (e.g. Gbaya with Gbaya and Mbororo with Mbororo), which was seen as generally positive as refugees were more easily assimilated. Several interviewees noted that certain communities were able to adjust better to their situation, both within the refugee population, and between refugees and host communities, and were better able to recover and improve their socio-economic conditions. On the other hand, this was also noted as a potential conflict driver as there was then exclusion of the "other" - this inclusion-exclusion dynamic was particularly noticeable among Mbororo and Gbaya, and there were also several conflicts reported between them.

125. This specific finding reinforces this SCA key issue of insecurity and banditry: "we perceive a real fear and insecurity reading the answers given by these young Cameroonians who often live in more remote areas where the influence of state authority, particularly through the security forces, is often lower than in large cities. We have seen for example in the East Region that young farmers were directly confronted with kidnapping and assault groups presumably from Central African Republic." DMJ (2015) Page 37.

126. Koum, C.C. (2008) 'Service national "Justice et Paix" : Un caillou dans la chaussure du gouvernement' La Nouvelle Expression: 25 September 2008. Available at: <http://www.cameroon-info.net/stories/0,23646,@.service-national-justice-et-paix-un-caillou-dans-la-chaussure-du-gouvernement.html>

Case study – Five interviewees recounted, from different perspectives, a similar story about the murder of the young Gbaya man in the town of Mandjou. After the murder, violence erupted in the town with shops destroyed, people injured, and finally a curfew was called for one week. This incident was interpreted as a miscarriage of justice by Mbororo interviewees who said that an Mbororo young man was falsely accused of murder and held for 9 months before the real culprit was found; a young man who had been in conflict with the Gbaya man over a woman. Gbaya interviewees said that the Mbororo man was guilty of murder and arrested. This case study illustrates several issues – how community violence can erupt over an individual act of interpersonal violence, how perceptions of the past are based upon one’s identity group(s), and how rumors can fuel conflict.

8. RESILIENCE

Cameroonian people and institutions have demonstrated great resilience in response to the massive refugee crises on their various borders. They call themselves “peaceful” and tolerant peoples and, as noted earlier, Cameroon is labeled an island of peace among many troubled countries. The institutions of local government have been able to manage the influx of refugees and, as noted above in the institutional performance section, in many cases adapted to deal with the issues arising around those refugees. By allowing such a large number of refugees to settle in villages and live with host families, systems of resilience were developed that have served as alternatives to violence. There have been conflicts over resources, but such conflicts have been remarkably managed considering the immense challenges.

In the case of the cross-border attacks by armed groups from neighboring countries, the Cameroonian government has also been remarkably resilient – using patterns of conflict avoidance in spite of shells, bullets, kidnappers, and bandits landing in Cameroonian territory. The armed forces have gone in to retrieve hostages, but apparently rely more on peaceful and low-impact responses to these provocations.

Perhaps one area that has been lacking resilience is the various responses of individuals, communities, organizations, and institutions to the problems of youth (unemployment and underemployment, crime, drugs, etc.). Although most interviewees spoke about these problems, there were few projects or organizations working with youth. The lack of livelihood opportunities for youth also exacerbated the inability to build resilience.

The management of agro-pastoral conflict has been reported to have been successful historically due to the flexibility of the parties involved. This report has outlined the increasing challenges to that flexibility and resilience of traditional dispute-resolution systems (climate change, narrowing of transhumance corridors, increased presence of armed pastoralists, etc.) which are now challenging the management and dispute resolution systems – new solutions will have to be found.

.....
Cameroonian people and institutions have demonstrated great resilience in response to the massive refugee crises on their various borders.
.....

Trajectories

Trajectories include both trends (long-term) and triggers (short-term) that can lead to either greater stability or instability, and to conflict or reconciliation. These are based upon either the literature review or the perceptions of interviewees.

1. TRIGGERS

A handful of triggers focusing in the East have been identified by the interviewees. Firstly, the potential for violent incidents between refugees and host communities; refugees and refugees; or possibly, between different groups (such as between the Mbororo and Gbaya). These incidents have been occurring, and seem most likely to occur in the future, related to agro-pastoral conflicts (most often due to destruction of farms by herd animals), or to conflicts over resources (arguments over water, firewood, or access to services such as schools and health centers).

Secondly, incidents of violence around insecurity were found to be causing great grievances for host communities (as well as refugees) in the East and could potentially bubble over into localized, and then possibly, widespread violence. These included robbery, theft, assault, rape, and kidnappings, with drugs at the community level often involved in the East, and the larger-scale kidnappings and banditry perpetrated by armed groups from neighboring countries (CAR or Chad) or from remote areas in Cameroon.

Finally, at the national level, the literature, as well as many interviewees, noted concerns over a possible sudden change in national leadership. As President Biya is 83 years of age, and the public is not aware of clear transition plan, there are fears of instability and a potential scramble over power. In addition, as happened in 2008, a sudden spike in commodity prices could trigger violent conflict, if such groups as the motorcycle-taxi syndicates got involved and mobilized their members.

.....
One trigger identified was the potential for violent incidents between refugees and host communities; refugees and refugees; or possibly, between different groups (such as between the Mbororo and Gbaya).
.....

2. TRENDS

The following trends were highlighted by interviewees and the literature:

- Migration from rural to urban areas (particularly youth).
- Uncontrolled proliferation of Evangelical and Pentecostal churches and extremist Muslim sects preaching intolerance.
- Recurring complaints of agro-pastoralists – and spread of invasive Bokassa grass, which is greatly reducing available land for animals.
- Discrimination and stigmatization – at times developing into xenophobia, especially if new waves of refugees arrive.
- Rising social tensions in the face of increasing lack of resources (water, wood, land) and unemployment.
- Although the East remains relatively weak in comparison to the rest of the country’s development, the area continues to slowly improve (but not everywhere).
- Worldwide trend towards decreasing humanitarian assistance in Africa, and due to urgency in the North, aid is focused more on the North than the East.

- The policy of the UNHCR to give 70:30 percent aid to refugees:host communities has served to reduce tensions related to jealousy in some areas, though perceptions of Cameroonians in general, many host communities, and those living around refugee camps remain that refugees are getting more assistance than Cameroonians of equal or greater need.
- The Muslim population is increasing in the East with the influx of (mainly Muslim) refugees, and this can have an impact on economic and political dimensions. The perception that refugees are obtaining Cameroonian citizenship illegally has increased fears in some quarters that the region will start to vote for Muslim political candidates and that the political landscape has already changed.¹²⁷
- (Unconfirmed) population movements from the North to the South/East (fleeing conflict, seeking stability).
- (Unconfirmed) increase in prostitution in some border areas, and in areas with mining projects.

127. Kossoumna Liba'a, N. (2015) Etude sur les Conflits Agro-Pastoraux dans les Régions Camerounaises du Nord, Adamaoua et Est : Rapport Final. Lutheran World Federation (Commissioned by UNHCR) : December 2015.

Conclusions

Cameroon is a generally understudied country, due to its relative success at maintaining peace and stability, and this SCA has provided a rare opportunity for in-depth research focusing on its eastern border with CAR. While the risk of widespread violent conflict does not seem high, there are still some areas of concern, especially due to the incursions and pressure from conflicts in CAR, Chad, and Nigeria. The presence of hundreds of thousands of refugees has taxed the institutions and infrastructure of the country, especially in the more vulnerable border areas in the North and East. In the East, risk of violence has been identified in this SCA around local-level conflict over resources, agro-pastoral conflicts, and insecurity and crime, and at a national level around national leadership, terrorism, and youth disenfranchisement.

Although the purpose of this assessment was not specifically to assess the desire of refugees to return, in the context of interviews, it was clear that the majority of CAR refugees were not ready to return, particularly in the near or medium term. As a traditional Mboboro leader said: “[in CAR] I had many heads of cattle and a home, now I have nothing there and I lost many family members. But here, at least I have a small home and small place to farm - why would I go back to nothing?” Some of the wealthier refugees may be more willing to return (a few of whom have been reported to have already gone back), as some see business opportunities arising if the recent election results in greater stability for the country.

We asked interviewees what their vision of the future was in five years. Most of the refugees, as well as some rural Cameroonians, were unable to think that far ahead. The years of conflict and the resulting trauma, and the upcoming elections in CAR contributed to feelings of uncertainty. However, some refugees, along with other Cameroonian interviewees, spoke of hopes for economic and social development of the East, if it reached both the host communities and the refugees. There were also fears expressed of terrorism (particularly of Boko Haram), but these were mainly for the North and the national level. Most of the fears for the future expressed by Cameroonian interviewees were around a potential sudden change of government and a resulting struggle for power. These fears of transition have also been pointed out by various observers such as the International Crisis Group over the past years, but have not yet come to fruition. In spite of the fears, many still hope for a smooth transition.

.....
While the risk of widespread violent conflict does not seem high, there are still some areas of concern, especially due to the incursions and pressure from conflicts in CAR, Chad, and Nigeria.
.....

Response options

As a final step to this SCA, the following response options were developed by the participant researchers based on interviews, and gathered from the literature review. The purpose of this SCA is to provide feedback into CRS programming, based on the various elements of the CAF (conflict dynamics and potential trajectories), in order to prevent, manage, and mitigate conflict. As noted above, the key East Region issues identified were local-level conflicts over resources, agro-pastoral conflicts, insecurity and crime, and by extension, conflicts arising based on identity group (ethnic, religious, or refugee versus host community). National-level issues were uncertainty over national leadership transitions, terrorism, and youth unemployment [See detailed response recommendations developed for each research site (Batouri, Bertoua, Garoua-Boulai) in Appendix 4].

.....
The key East Region issues identified were local-level conflicts over resources, agro-pastoral conflicts, insecurity and crime, and by extension conflicts arising based on identity group (ethnic, religious, or refugee versus host community).
.....

A general recommendation for CRS and its partners is to conduct programmatic planning sessions based on this SCA, to ensure that the results are taken into consideration in their various projects. The SCA should also be updated periodically to, at a minimum, review the key issues and the key actors for peace and conflict, and the implications for programming.

1. TRANSHUMANCE

- **After consultation with agro-pastoralists, the government should limit, but clearly define grazing corridors, and put into place local conflict-resolution mechanisms for agro-pastoral conflicts.** While several interviewees recommended the protection and limitation of transhumance corridors (and agricultural areas) as a solution to increasing conflicts, some studies suggest that this may not be a panacea, and that local, more flexible solutions may be more effective and resilient.¹²⁸
- Another recommendation made in the literature and by interviewees was the **development of basic services along transhumance corridors**, particularly water points and access to markets and health (both animal and human) care.¹²⁹
- An important aspect of all solutions would be to **include the end-users (both pastoralists and agriculturists) in decision-making**, which would require special efforts due to the pastoralists' nomadic lifestyles, as well as special efforts to include the voices of youth and women.
- **Seek lessons learned from various sources.** An innovative transhumance project recently started in CAR includes many of these measures, such as participatory decision-making and conflict resolution, micro-projects, veterinary care, and other technical assistance.
- **Coordinate** transhumance regulations and solutions with neighboring countries, and between government and civil society.

128. Moritz, M. et al. (2013) Rangeland governance in an open system: Protecting transhumance corridors in the Far North Province of Cameroon. *Pastoralism: Research, Policy and Practice* 3:26 October 2013. Available at: <http://pastoralismjournal.springeropen.com/articles/10.1186/2041-7136-3-26>

129. Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme (2010) Legislation to Support Crossborder Livestock Mobility. Policy Brief Number 14 February 2010.

2. YOUTH

Because youth unemployment, as well as social problems of youth (crime, drug use, religious extremism, etc.) were identified as a potential conflict-causing issues, several recommendations have been made below concerning youth to **reduce the likelihood of youth becoming conflict actors**.

- **Provide livelihood options for Cameroonian and refugee youth.** This is a great priority given the concerns about youth underemployment.
- **Provide increased voice of youth in decision-making** as their involvement in planning their own futures can reduce the risk of their being involved in conflict, and reduce frustration in daily life.
- For example, a recommendation under social cohesion is for training for media in conflict-sensitive reporting – a report from the NGO *Dynamique Mondiale des Jeunes* reinforced the importance of the **media to combatting the rosy picture painted by armed group recruiters**, and young people referred to the duty of the media to inform and educate, particularly in the fight against stigma (against Muslims) in some communities.¹³⁰
- Another recommendation is to **develop critical-thinking skills, and training in stereotype reduction**, as the report also noted that “money could be the only argument to engage”. Recruiters, for example, also use social and political issues or religion in their arguments, by citing the sense of injustice, frustration, and the need for revenge. Youth should have more voice in local and national-level decision-making.

.....
Providing livelihood options for Cameroonian and refugee youth is a great priority.
.....

3. GENDER

Although gender issues were not linked directly to a risk of future conflict, women were identified as current and potential actors for peace. In addition, because SGBV was identified as a key problem in Cameroon, especially for refugee women, the following response options are included to reduce the incidence of GBV.

4. LAND

Land issues are increasingly becoming important, related to the arrival of refugees and to the pressures on the transhumance corridors. Whether host communities have lent, rented, or sold land to refugees for farming, pasturage, or businesses has varied by locality. While more research is needed, additional attention should focus on the realities of these land disputes and on ways to solve them. One interviewee suggested reviewing for comparison “the legal framework in Ethiopia set up for agreements between the UNHCR and the local governments, with the involvement of the local populations and the refugees, to not only reach agreements between land holders and the ‘guests’ in the area, but also to sensitize the different populations in the area to the crisis”. Norwegian Refugee Council has done a great deal of work in this area in other countries and could be contacted for a possible joint project.

130. Dynamique Mondiale des Jeunes (2015) L'enrôlement des jeunes dans les groupes armés au Cameroun Service Civil pour la Paix, Dynamique Mondiale des Jeunes, October 2015 : Available at : http://www.peaceworkafrica.net/IMG/pdf/DMJ_Rapport_etude_enrole-ment_final_301115-2.pdf

5. FOR INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: GENERAL DEVELOPMENT AND HUMANITARIAN APPROACHES

These general recommendations are basic tenets of development work but are based on the key issue of potential conflict highlighted between refugees and host communities, and grievances expressed by all communities about a lack of state services (water, agriculture, education, health) as well as a lack of involvement in planning for their own future development.

The vast majority of conflicts noted in this SCA are based upon an overall lack of resources and underdevelopment in the East of the country – exacerbated by the presence of refugees. These recommendations, though normally considered as part of the context or background of an SCA, are seen as extremely important in order to prevent future conflict – in the short, medium, and long term. Additional recommendations in this section address the importance of grievances expressed by certain groups (youth, certain ethnic and religious groups, and host communities in relation to aid given to refugees) as being excluded and not adequately consulted.

.....
The vast majority of conflicts noted in this SCA are based upon an overall lack of resources and underdevelopment in the East of the country – exacerbated by the presence of refugees.
.....

Although this SCA's purpose was not to analyze development or humanitarian assistance, many of the recommendations were related to the manner in which assistance was delivered, and the need to better utilize participatory and inclusive methods and to incorporate principles of social cohesion. Many are not new ideas, but interviewees felt that many of these practices were not currently happening. These recommendations are targeted at areas in which refugees are residing. Specific recommendations include:

- **Provide additional aid to refugees and host communities** as basic needs are currently not being met for food, health, livelihoods and protection.
- **Evaluate the needs of the entire community**, not just the refugees living in host communities and with special attention to the needs and voice of women and youth.
- **Understand the realities** on the ground (e.g. the needs of the population) before intervening.
- **Implicate local communities and refugees together in the planning and implementation** of humanitarian and development assistance and projects. **Include women, youth**, men, and vulnerable groups.
- **Improve communication between IOs, refugees, and local communities** through regular coordination meetings, and by setting up mechanisms which provide opportunities for honest and protected communication, such as suggestion boxes or community-led beneficiary feedback mechanisms that promote transparency and accountability.
- **Implicate local NGOs and local structures** (churches, mosques, local authorities, MINAS, MINPROF, etc.) in planning and implementation of projects. Strengthen local NGOs.
- **Conduct common projects with various groups** (refugees, host communities, etc.) through participation, inclusion, and legitimacy.
- **Implement conflict-sensitive approaches** (e.g. at the hospital in Bertoua MSF reportedly built a wing for refugees – perceived as unfair by local communities).

- **Empower youth and women** – in various development and income generation projects.
- **Develop infrastructure projects and sustainable development in border areas** where refugees are settled (including schools, health centers, water points, latrines, and roads).
- **Provide vocational training and income generation projects for youth.**
- **Monitor the extraction of natural resources and the impact on local communities.**
- **Engage potential conflict actors – moto-taxis** – Assist moto-taxi syndicates to register and recognize moto-taxi drivers, provide services such as health care, small loans, etc.
- **Examine the role of “Vigilance Committees”** and ensure that all villagers are represented. Consider lessons learned from other community-based security programs which empower local communities to improve their own security while at the same time promoting social cohesion. These include the CRS SECC program in CAR, as well as various other projects such as Saferworld in Nepal. Ensure that the voice of women is included as well as issues related to SGBV.
- **Provide additional mental health services** – particularly for traumatized refugees.

6. FOR ALL - STRENGTHEN LOCAL AUTHORITIES AND CIVIL SOCIETY

This SCA has provided a strong justification for the interventions aimed at local authorities included in the CRS UNHCR proposal. The local authorities and traditional leaders are often identified as potent powers for peace, and when decision-making, particularly over resource control, is done in a participatory and inclusive manner, then other drivers of conflict (based on grievances of marginalization and exclusion by refugees, Muslims, or other groups) can be mitigated.

.....
 When decision-making, particularly over resource control, is done in a participatory and inclusive manner, then other drivers of conflict can be mitigated.

- **Reinforce the capacity of local authorities and traditional leaders**, and other social actors in problem-solving, decision-making, conflict resolution, etc. - **Include women and youth**, and special programs for wives of traditional leaders (queens).
- **Conduct exchange visits** for outstanding Cameroonian local authorities to capitalize on the relative strength and legitimacy in conflict resolution.
- **Provide training in human rights, protection and SGBV** to improve treatment of refugees and women.
- **Identify and prosecute security forces** who abuse refugee rights and commit SGBV.
- **Reinforce capacities of members of Vigilance and Social Cohesion Committees.**

7. FOR ALL – SOCIAL COHESION AND CIVIC EDUCATION – SENSITIZATION, TRAINING, AND CAPACITY-BUILDING

Several interviewees noted some difficulties arising between various groups (ethnic, religious, refugee/host, etc.) due to competition for resources or lack of communication and coordination amongst aid

agencies. Thus, these recommendations are important in order to ‘do no harm’ and to reduce dissatisfaction, frustration, and grievances. The majority of the following activities are related to the goal of **increasing understanding between different ethnic, religious, and other groups to promote social cohesion, reduce prejudice and stereotyping, and improve their capacity to resolve conflicts**. While a few projects exist (CRS and CARE), more are needed. For example, in Garoua-Boulai, UN Women were conducting a project in what they labeled “Social Cohesion Spaces”, with activities focused primarily on reducing GBV.

- **Promote civic and moral education** including rights and duties of citizens and refugees.
- **Implement community activities to promote social cohesion**
- **Promote inter-religious dialogue**
- **Promote cultural and sports activities**, after preparing each group separately.
- **Create community radio stations and programs** - by both local and international organizations that permit refugees and host communities to express themselves (use local languages).
- **Sensitize others on a wide variety of topics relating to recommendations in this SCA** including: national discussions on the situation of refugees and aid; the rights and needs of refugees; the necessity of social cohesion; inclusion of host communities in distribution of assistance; and, respect for law and authority.
- **Disseminate more information** - to dispel misperceptions about host community and refugee differences.
- The **media should be educated in conflict-sensitive reporting** - Because media have been playing a role in recruitment of youth in armed conflict and in spreading rumors about various ethnic and religious groups and thus increasing stereotypes, stigmatization, and misunderstandings.
- **Implement programs on inter-generational communication** - As the potential for intergenerational conflict was identified especially in the context of youth marginalization and between various Muslim factions, youth programs should also consider including aspects of inter-generational communication.
- **Include former combatants from CAR** - in social cohesion activities and development activities to reduce likelihood they will take up arms upon return.

8. FOR ALL - COORDINATION

- **Improve coordination** of activities of UNHCR and its partners, including government.
- **Create a network of organizations working on social cohesion**, including an action plan which is put into practice - as per John Paul Lederach’s schematic of peacebuilding, whereby horizontal and vertical linkages should be built in order to enhance social cohesion.

9. FOR GOVERNMENT

While for the most part, many local authorities were seen as actors for peace rather than conflict, and while they and traditional chiefs are seen as playing an important role in resolving disputes, problems of corruption and abuse of authority remain. While the government has focused

on removing terrorism threats, government support for interreligious dialogue has been minimal.

See section on strengthening local authorities.

- **Organize events to promote social cohesion** (such as celebrating the International Day of Peace on 21 September by including refugees; or other annual events, and include popular sports or music figures) in order to promote social patterns of inclusion, participation, and reduce stigmatization and exclusion. Miss Cameroon has stated she campaigns for peace. The Minister of Women's Affairs and the Resident Representative of UNDP organized a climb to the top of Mount Febe to highlight the problem of Violence against Women.
- **Support and engage with religious leaders** to promote social cohesion etc.
- **Create a national succession plan in preparation for the future president of Cameroon**, to address the potential trigger identified around possible changes in national leadership.
- **Strengthen security arrangements at the borders with CAR and Chad** in order to reduce the risks of insecurity and banditry.
- **Implement a program of peace education, citizenship, and anti-corruption in all schools** – As youth are identified as a primary target to reduce the potential for violence, and their strengths can be harnessed to work for peace, this is a long-term goal.
- Implement on the ground a **durable development plan for refugees and local populations** with a long-term vision.
- **Review the policy of refugee registration with UNHCR and civil society**. Many interviewees spoke about the perception that there was great corruption among local authorities – they were giving citizenship, identification papers, and birth certificates to refugees illegally – and this perception leads to feelings of frustration towards refugees.
- **Create a national refugee policy**. Implement the laws relating to protection of refugees, their future possible citizenship, and clarify policy towards freedom of movement.
- Implement a management plan for **environmentally-sensitive extraction of natural resources** (minerals, wood, etc.) after consultation with affected communities, and considering safe employment practices for local communities.
- **Decrease porousness of borders** to reduce terrorism and banditry threats from outside the country.
- **Involve youth in decision-making and increase youth employment** – through organized councils at the national level down to the local level, and employ more youth in civil service jobs. Create services to promote youth employment and involvement in decision-making.
- **Improve information sharing with local communities**. The DMJ report cites a “lack of reliable information at the population level, which leaves the field open to rumor and causes certain confusion. Again, the authorities have a role to play, as was raised by the young respondents to this study.”¹³¹

131. Quote has been translated from its original French. Dynamique Mondiale des Jeunes (2015) L'enrolement des jeunes dans les groupes armes au Cameroun Service Civil pour la Paix, Dynamique Mondiale des Jeunes, October 2015 : Available at : http://www.peaceworkafrica.net/IMG/pdf/DMJ_Rapport_etude_enrolement_final_301115-2.pdf

10. FOR DONORS

- **Provide increased development and humanitarian support** – especially in the East, Adamawa, and the North.
- **Support long-term social cohesion projects.**
- **Include social cohesion social components in all projects.**
- **Provide support to inter-religious groups, civil society, and government for social cohesion activities.**
- **Implement conflict sensitive approaches** for donors and their grantees.

11. GENERAL - RESEARCH

Several research priorities have been identified, which can shed light on the situation of several of the conflict dynamics identified above:

- The **role of rumors** identified as a factor in both engaging youth communities in armed conflict, as well as in spreading negative perceptions about various identity groups.
- Conduct additional research into **management of transhumance corridors, and agro-pastoral conflicts.**
- **Identity card use and misuse**, particularly by refugees.
- **Political implications of (Muslim) refugee presence in the East.**
- **Youth role in religious extremism.**
- **Role of women in peacebuilding** in order to capitalize upon strengths and make programmatic recommendations.

Appendices



CRS/Cameroon SCA Team in Bertoua at the close of the debrief. *Photo courtesy of Ariana Proctor*

1. LIST OF CAF TEAM MEMBERS

Laura McGrew – CRS SCA Team Leader (Consultant)
Ian Proctor – CRS Cross-Border Focal Point (Consultant)
James Sayre – CRS/CAR Peacebuilding, Governance, and Gender Program Manager
Herman Pouokam – CRS/Cameroon Social Cohesion Program Manager
Franck Tsafack – CRS/Cameroon Project Officer
Eugene Gwain – CRS/Cameroon Project Officer
Joël Teguia – CRS/Cameroon Deputy Project Coordinator
Tierry Nchinda – CODASC Batouri
Gabriel Noa Tsala – CODASC Batouri
Marceline Bakam – CODASC Batouri
Guy Raoul Kouakam Nono – CDJP Bertoua
Djibrilla Hamadjoda – CDJP Bertoua
Armel Idriss Mvondo – CDJP Bertoua
Marlise Loumoh – CDJP Garoua-Boulai
Honoré Pendha – CDJP Garoua-Boulai
Liboard Boundar – CDJP Garoua-Boulai

2. LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

Six people elected to remain anonymous and thus their names have been left off of the list below.

Yaoundé

Kareen Cerdana, CRS Program Manager
Sylvestre Eves, Executive Director for ACADIR
Pierre Titi, Member ELECAM
Serge Barbare, CRS Head of Programs
David Brownstein, Political Section Chief, U.S. Embassy
Connor O'Steen, U.S. Embassy
Representative for USAID
Anastasie, Media Director for SNJP/Nkeng Shalom
Secretary-General for CEPAC

David Bayang, Deputy Director for SNJP
Djibrine, Secretary-General for the Superior Islamic Council
Jean Baptiste Talla, CRS Peacebuilding Technical Advisor
Oliver Mokom, Deputy Director for CRS KIDSS Project
Dupleix Kuenzob, Executive Secretary for the Dynamique Mondiale des Jeunes (DMJ)

Boulembe

Philémon Ndozen, Chef Traditionnel
Djibrilla Dgaoro, Chief Imam of the Central Mosque
Alan Bertrand Ngongo Bekonde, Director of the the Public School
Berthe Guimatio, Head of the Health Center
Hammadou Jaouba, Refugee
Kelly Garama, Member of the Youth Association

Giwa Yangamo

Gilbert Bouba, Chef Traditionnel
Ghislain Sana, Secretary-General for Camp 2 of the Refugee Association
Marie Claire Motumba, Member of the Mixed Social Association
Felix Guemedji Kokou, Pastor for the Apostolic Church
Andre Ndoumba, Farmer and Representative of the Farmers Association
Romain Yannick Yambogaza, Member of CDJP-Giwa Yangamo
Adolphe Ndedi, Provisor of the High School
Debat Assiyatho, Student at the High School
François Ndengo, Farmer and Refugee
Giselle Rachete, Merchant
Labgachi, Student and Refugee
Delphin Zounguer, Student and Refugee
Idrissa Mamoudou, Harbo and Head of the Mbororo Community for the Refugees
Fabrice Balla Ndeteng, Abby for the Parish of St. Jen Marie-Vianney
Clement Youjoute, Retired President of the Third Refugee Camp
Guy Apollinaire Wandembala, Refugee
Sammy Romaric Florentin Koudou, Pastor for the Pilot Revival Church of Cameroon

Bertoua

Jules Epam Ndjallo, Director of CDJP Bertoua
Abakar Ahamad, Governor of the East Region
Alphonse Didier, MINAS Delegate
Marie Paule Mekou, Assistant Principal of Social Affairs, National Solidarity Service, MINAS
Josep Zapater, Head of the UNHCR Sub-Delegation in the East Region
Mohammed Bashirou, Representative for the Superior Islamic Council
Claude Mengue Assoah, Priest in the Archdiocese of Bertoua and Chaplain for the Prison of Bertoua
Giscard Bounga, Journalist for Radio AURORA
Rene Yesus Samba, President for the East Region of the National Moto Taxi Syndicate, the National Syndicate of Urban Professional Drivers of Cameroon, and the Organization of Ground Transports
Aliou Garga Hamman, Director for MBOSCUA
Daniel Njeng, Delegate for the Director of the Prison Administration

Mandjou

Samuel Menogo, Sub-Prefect
Marigoh Mboua Marcel Corneill, Head of the MINAS Health Center
Boniface Kana, Manager of Communal Development at MINAS
Jean Paul Rikam, 1st Adjunct to the Commissioner of Police, 4th Arrondissement
Hamadicko Mouhamado, 2nd Notable and Chef Traditionnel for Mandjou II
Jospeh Benate, Chef Traditionnel of Bindia
Moïse Ndinga, Chef Traditionnel of Mandjou I
Evelyne Tobio, Director for Group 1B of the Public Primary School for Mandjou II
Sale el Hadj Mohamadou Marigariki, Harbo and Chef Traditionnel of the Refugees
Adamou Oumarou, Teacher at the Islamic School

Abdoulaye Zenaba, Server at the Restaurant Menu du Jour de Mandjou Carefour
Ousman Adamou, Mototaximan
Mouhamadou Aliou, Mototaximan
Mouhamadou Moubarak, Mototaximan
Hamadou Yousoufa, Mototaximan

BAZZAMA

Patrice Adoug Adoug, Director of the Primary School
Adamou Mokano, Refugee
Aladji Hidikao Haman, Hardo and Chef Traditionnel for the Refugee Community
Alima Oueseini, President of the Refugee Women's Association
S.M. Djoni Kassala Innocent, Village Chief

Adjinkol

Alvine Namo, First Councilor for the ER-ZANGMA Association (Main dans la main)
Flore Mbango, Second Councilor for the ER-ZANGMA Association (Main dans la main)
Marceline Ndawo, Communication Director for the ER-ZANGMA Association (Main dans la main)
Jeremie Koumanda Keoke, Commander of the Vigilance Committee

Kouba

Philemon Ngouri, Chef Traditionnel

Batouri

Adamou Baba, Chef Traditionnel of the Muslim Community
Salomon Fouapon, Head of Office for Kadey and Boumba et Ngoko Prefectures, UN Women
Adèle Libam, Gender, Economic Rehabilitation, and Social Cohesion Expert, UN Women
David Bouan Kombo, Chef Traditionnel of the Adventist Quarter
Simon Bakongo, Journalist and Announcer for the Ketté Community Radio
Abdoulaye Moussa, Imam for the Refugee Site
Hamadou Gondi, Chef Traditionnel for the Refugee Site
Christian Mvoe, CRS Project Officer
Serge Patrick Mandomobe, Priest and CODASC Coordinator
Ghislain Tiadjeu, UNHCR Batouri Protection Associate
Richard Godwe, Special Commissioner for the Police
Parfait Ayissi Manga, Captain of the National Gendarme
Moïse Issa Damboura, Canton Chief for Kako Ngwako
Emmanuel Bob-iga, Sub-prefect
Emmanuel Halpha, Prefect

Ketté

Julien Biye, Adjunct to the Sub-Prefect
A/C Oumarou, Brigade Commander for the Gendarme
Emmanuel Gbanga, Mayor
Gaston Berger Foussoum, Chaplain for Migrants and Displaced Persons for the Diocese of Batouri

Mama II

Ibrahim Bouba, Head of the Refugee Community

Timangolo

Issa Moussa Mahamat, President of the Refugee Site
Hawaou Hamadou, President of the Refugee Women's Committee
Hadjara Moumini, Member of the Refugee Women's Committee
Rabiatou Massoura, Member of the Refugee Women's Committee
Nourou Moussa, Adjunct President for the Refugee Youth Committee
Jacqui Beng, Manager of Construction for Première Urgence
Sambo Floribert, Spokesperson for the Head of the Village
Bina Jean de Paul, Secretary of the Chefferie
Jean Baptist Bolo, Teacher in the Refugee Site

Kentzou

Clement Essama, Adjunct to the Sub-Prefect
Faustin Ndoa Aoudou, Head of the Kako'o Community
Sabine Kounou Epse Ndoa, Wife of the Chef Traditionnel
Ibrahim Ousmanou, PLAN Community Relay and CRS WASH Project Animator
Awa Mahamat, President of the Refugee Women's Association
Simon Zock Langoul, Abby for the Kentzou Parish

Lolo

Bello Hamadjoda, President of Youth for the Site Committee
Faysal Inoua, Member of the Youth Committee
Ismaella Saliou, President of the Mototaximen
Alkassi, Vice President of the Central Committee of Refugees
Gervais Billong, Première Urgence Camp Manager
Catherine Fosso, UNHCR Field Associate
Ramatou Yaouba, Member of the Women's Committee
Aminatou Diarou, Member of the Women's Committee
Aminatou Ouzeifa, Member of the Women's Committee
Zénabou Mamadou, Member of the Women's Committee
Aïssatou, Member of the Women's Committee
Nicolas Mbonga, Village Head
Bernard Djangoa, President of the Vigilance Committee
Jean Marie Mela Yanda, Merchant and President of the Youth Committee

Mbilé

Jérémie Mbassa, Chef Traditionnel
Adouraman, Member of the Refugee Youth Association
Mamadou Bachirou, Secretary-General of the Refugee Youth Association
Amidou Issa, Councilor of the Refugee Youth Association
Abbas Mohamet, Member of the Refugee Youth Association
Adam Wassongo, Member of the Refugee Youth Association
Rabiatou Bouba, President of the Refugee Women's Association
Ramatou Adjoudi, Vice President of the Refugee Women's Association
Couloume Zaoro, Secretary-General of the Refugee Women's Association
Aliou Garga, Member of the Central Committee
Saladin Hassan, Secretary-General of the Central Committee
Hardo Adamou Zoumba, Block 1 Delegate of the Central Committee
Sheiou Youssoufa, Block 2 Delegate of the Central Committee
Moussa Laylai, Block 3 Delegate of the Central Committee
Saoudou Nourou, Member of the Central Committee
Bakari Bouba, Merchant

Garoua-Boulai

Caldonie Nanga Mbone, Doctor and Head of the MINSANTE Health Center
Christian Bata, Refugee and Brick Maker
Ayissi, Vicar of the Catholic Church
Francis Abanda Kizijo, Director of the MINEFOP Family Agriculture School
Patrice Yetna, Head of the Parish of Bethany
Hamadou Abo, Chief of the Central Market Quarter for the Merchant Syndicate
Blandine Mandari, President of the Bayam-Selam Association for the Merchant Syndicate
Blaise Kombo Kombo, Technical Director of the Radio-Nda-Ngoh
Ngako, Municipal Councilor for the Decentralized Territorial Authority
Guy Mbezou, Pastor for the Lutheran Evangelical Church
Apollinaire Mendjere, Construction Worker and Deforo Quarter Chief
Pépin Semdi, Vice President of the Central African Refugee Community
Awal, Merchant
Sambo Adia, Evangelist for the EE LC Zoukounde Parish of the Lutheran Evangelical Church
Etienne Zaoro, Zoukounde Quarter Chief

Tihomo

Mamdou, Tihomo Site Supervisor for the Islamic NGO
Ousmanou Bouba, Herder and Refugee

Gado Badzere

Jules Ewouli, Mason and Host Community Member
Boubakary Poya, Harbo for the Refugee Community
Aubin Narke, Refugee and Technician
Marcelin Kongbo, Refugee
Ali, Community Relay for UN Women
Arsene Yendo Tchoro, President of the Students' Collective
Harouna Aoudou, Imam for the Local Muslim Community
Hélène Djuissi, Director of the MINEDUB Primary School
Hadjila, President of the Refugee Women
Mbarsola, Director for MINEDUB CES
Laurence Diyen Jam, Civil Administrator

Garga Sarali

Mbelle Kombo, Canton Chief
Martin Mvogo, Director of the MINEDUB Primary School
Bounguene Zoulde, President of the Development Committee for the Farmers' Association

Betare Oya

Canton Chief and Chef Traditionnel (remained unnamed)
François Michel Rama Rebout, President of the Central African Refugee Community

4. RESPONSE OPTIONS BY RESEARCH SITE¹³²

a. Batouri

SCA - Matrix de « Brainstorming » des Options de Réponse

Site/ Village	Problèmes Clés	Options de Réponse déjà sur place	Options de Réponses (suggérer par les interviewés, ou par l'équipes.)	Acteurs de Réponse
Batouri	Conflits Agropastoraux	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Arrangement à l'amiable • Commission de gestion des conflits 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Renforcement des capacités des Leaders Communautaires sur la gestion de conflit et la promotion de la paix. • Sensibiliser les cultivateurs pour entourer le champ par le fil de fer barbelé • Délimiter les zones de pâturage de culture 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ONGs (ONU Femmes, HCR, Et partenaires, autres ONGs locales et internationales) • Autorités administratives (Sous Préfet, Préfet, Maire) • Chefs traditionnels • Agriculteurs • Eleveurs
	Pression sur les ressources locales (eau, espace cultivable, bois)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fabrication et distribution des Foyers améliorés pour le problème de bois de chauffage en cour • Création de quelques puits d'eau dans les communautés 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Renforcement de capacité des comités de gestion du point d'eau. • Augmenter les points d'eau et réhabiliter ceux qui sont en panne. • Ouvrir une plateforme de dialogue réel pour trouver des solutions de cohésion sociale et non seulement pour intimider. • Fabrication et distribution des Foyers améliorés pour les deux populations pour le problème de bois de chauffage. • Faire le plaidoyer au Gouvernement pour l'accès de l'espace cultivable aux réfugiés. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ONGs (CARE, Premier Urgence, HCR, ACF) • Projet WASH CRS /CODAS • Comité pour la gestion de points d'eau • Autorités administratives (Sous-Préfet, Préfet, Maire) • Chefs traditionnels Populations hôte • Réfugiés • Agriculteurs • Eleveurs
Ketté	Conflits Agropastoraux	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Arrangement des disputes à l'amiable • Commission de gestion des conflits mise en place au niveau de la chefferie et à la sous-préfecture 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Renforcement des capacités des Leaders Communautaires en gestion de conflit et promotion de la paix. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ONGs nationales et internationales • Autorités administratives (Sous Préfet, Préfet, Maire) • Chefs traditionnels • Agriculteurs • Eleveurs
	Grand banditisme	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Comité de vigilance pour la surveillance et la sécurité de la communauté. • L'action de forces de l'ordre. Gendarmerie de proximité (une approche qui existe déjà à Kette) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Renforcement de capacité de comité de vigilance sur la sécurité et équipement en matériel de travail. • Renforcer la collaboration (communication et système d'alerte précoce) entre la population, le comité de vigilance, les chefs, les forces de maintien de l'ordre et les autorités administratives. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Autorités administratives • Forces de l'ordre • Populations locales et réfugiés, • ONG, Force de l'ordre, Comités locales (comité de vigilance).

132. As these detailed response options are most useful for practical application in Cameroon, they have been left in French for use with program planning

Site/ Village	Problèmes Clés	Options de Réponse déjà sur place	Options de Réponses (suggérer par les interviewés, ou par l'équipes.)	Acteurs de Réponse
	Pression sur les ressources locales (eau, espace cultivable, bois)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Gestion des conflits par les leaders traditionnels 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Renforcement des comités de gestion du point d'eau a la prévention et gestion de conflit autour de point d'eau.. Augmenter les points d'eau et réhabilite ceux qui sont en panne. Ouvrir une plateforme de dialogue réel pour trouver des solutions de Cohésion sociale et non seulement pour intimider. Faire le plaidoyer au Gouvernement pour l'accès de l'espace cultivable aux réfugiés. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ONG, Projet WASH CRS Comité mixte de gestion d'eau Autorités administratives Chefs traditionnels Populations hôte Réfugiés Agriculteurs Eleveurs
Timangolo	Conflits Agropastoraux	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Arrangement des disputes à l'amiable Commission de gestion des conflits mise en place au niveau de la chefferie et à la sous-préfecture 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Renforcement des capacités des Leaders Communautaires en gestion de conflit et promotion de la paix. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Les bergers, les cultivateurs
	Bagarres aux points d'eau, pression sur le bois de chauffage	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Un comité mixte musulman /chrétien mise en place mais non fonctionnel 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Renforcement de capacité de comités de gestion existant du point d'eau. Augmenter les points d'eau et réhabilite ceux qui sont en panne. Ouvrir une plateforme de dialogue réel pour trouver des solutions de Cohésion sociale et non seulement pour intimider. Fabrication et distribution des Foyers améliorés pour les deux populations pour le problème de bois de chauffage. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Les ONGs,
	Insécurité (banditisme, vol, agression, violence)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Il existe un poste de gendarmerie a l'entrée de site de réfugiés. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Création d'un comité mixte de vigilance pour la surveillance et la securite du village Renforcer la collaboration entre le comité de vigilance, gendarmerie, les chefs et les autorités administratives. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Autorités administratives Forces de l'ordre Populations ONG Comite locale pour la paix et sécurité (comité de vigilance)

Site/ Village	Problèmes Clés	Options de Réponse déjà sur place	Options de Réponses (suggérer par les interviewés, ou par l'équipe.)	Acteurs de Réponse
Kentzou	Grand banditisme (vol, kidnapping), escroquerie et arnaque des forces de l'ordre	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> L'action de force de l'ordre pour le maintien de paix et la gestion de conflit. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sensibilisation de la population en vue de la dénonciation et de la collaboration avec les forces de maintien de l'ordre pour le démantèlement des groupes armées Surveillance transfrontalière (radar) par le CEMAC Renforcer la collaboration entre les comités formés sur les sites, les chefs et les autorités administratives et les ONG Création d'un comité de vigilance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Autorités administratives Forces de l'ordre Populations ONGs CEMAC, AU
	Stigmatisation generalisee (camerounais/ refugies, chretiens/ musulmans, Anti-balaka, / Séléka)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sensibilisation fait dans les communautés au sujet clivage religieuse 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Former les agents de la paix et cohésion sociale et cohabitation pacifique Renforcer les capacités des leaders religieux sur la sensibilisation à la cohésion sociale Mettre sur pied la plateforme de dialogue inter-religieuse. Faire fonctionner la radio communautaire de Kentzou qui est une cle importante pour la promotion de la paix. Organiser les causeries éducatives dans les écoles Promouvoir les activités culturelles pour la cohésion sociale Prédication de paix dans les églises et les mosquées 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Les leaders religieuses, ONGs, Sous Prefett, Maire, Leaders d'associations, enseignants, Chefs Traditionnels
	Litiges agropastoraux	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Arrangement des disputes à l'amiable Commission de gestion des conflits mise en place au niveau de la chefferie et à la sous-préfecture 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Renforcement des capacités des Leaders Communautaires en gestion de conflit et promotion de la paix. 	
	Problèmes au tour des points d'eau		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Renforcement de capacité de comités de gestion existant du point d'eau. Augmenter les points d'eau et réhabilite ceux qui sont en panne. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ONG, Projet WASH CRS Comité d'eau Autorités administratives Chefs traditionnels Populations hôte Réfugiés

Site/ Village	Problèmes Clés	Options de Réponse déjà sur place	Options de Réponses (suggérer par les interviewés, ou par l'équipes.)	Acteurs de Réponse
Lolo	Conflits agropastoraux	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Arrangement des disputes à l'amiable • Commission de gestion des conflits mise en place au niveau de la chefferie et à la sous-préfecture 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Renforcement des capacités des Leaders Communautaires en gestion de conflit et promotion de la paix. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ONG • Autorités administratives (Sous-Préfet, Préfet, Maire) • Chefs traditionnels • Réfugiés • Agriculteurs • Eleveurs
	Pression sur les ressources locales (eau, espace cultivable, bois)		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Renforcement des comités de gestion du point d'eau. • Augmenter les points d'eau et réhabiliter ceux qui sont en panne. • Ouvrir une plateforme de dialogue réel pour trouver des solutions de Cohésion Sociale et non seulement pour intimider. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ONG, • Projet WASH CRS • Comité d'eau • Autorités administratives • Chefs traditionnels • Populations hôtes • Réfugiés • Agriculteurs • Eleveurs
	Consommation des drogues		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Campagne de sensibilisation des jeunes contre la consommation des drogues. • Trauma Healing • Application de la réglementation en matière de vente des drogues (tramol) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Forces de l'ordre • Comités de vigilance • Autorités traditionnelles • ONGs
Mbilé	Pression sur les ressources locales (eau, espace cultivable, bois)		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Renforcement des comités de gestion du point d'eau à la prévention et gestion de conflit autour de point d'eau.. • Augmenter les points d'eau et réhabiliter ceux qui sont en panne. • Ouvrir une plateforme de dialogue réel pour trouver des solutions de Cohésion sociale et non seulement pour intimider. • Faire le plaidoyer au Gouvernement pour l'accès de l'espace cultivable aux réfugiés. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ONG, • Projet WASH CRS • Comité d'eau • Autorités administratives • Chefs traditionnels • Populations hôtes • Réfugiés • Agriculteurs • Eleveurs
	Litiges agropastoraux	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Arrangement des disputes à l'amiable • Commission de gestion des conflits mise en place au niveau de la chefferie et à la sous-préfecture 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Renforcement des capacités des Leaders Communautaires en gestion de conflit et promotion de la paix. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Agriculteurs • Eleveurs

Site/ Village	Problèmes Clés	Options de Réponse déjà sur place	Options de Réponses (suggérer par les interviewés, ou par l'équipes.)	Acteurs de Réponse
	<p>Manque d'abri de logement pour les réfugiés</p> <p>Imposition de la langue de l'ethnie majoritaire (Fulbe et Peul) dans le site de Mbilé</p>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ajouter les logements dans les sites • Fournir les kits de construction dans les sites de réfugiés • Faciliter l'accès à l'éducation primaire, secondaire et supérieure • Ajouter des salles de classe, table banc et enseignants • Former plus de personnes à la cohésion sociale • Donner aux jeunes et aux femmes l'accès à la prise de décision 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • HCR et son partenaire Shelter

b. Bertoua

SCA - Matrix de « Brainstorming » des Options de Réponse

Site/Village	Problèmes Clés	Options de Réponse déjà sur place	Options de Réponses (suggérer par les interviewés, ou par l'équipes)	Acteurs de Réponse
BOULEMBE	Insecurite (Delinquance juvenile, vols, agressions, consommation de drogue)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reglement des differents a la chefferie Transfert aux agents des forces de l'ordre 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mise sur pied d'un comite de vigilance Sensibilisation de la communité sur les mefaits de la delinquance Education à la citoyennete Creation des activites generatrices de revenu 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Chef du village Autorites administratives(Maire, sous-prefet)
	Conflits agro-pastoraux	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reglement des differents a la chefferie Interventiondes autorites chargees de l'elevage et de l'agriculture 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Creation des zones de paturage en tenant compte des avis a la fois des bergers et des agricultures Protection des espaces agraires avec des fils barbelles ou avec d'autres materiaux localement disponible Sensibilisation des eleveurs sur l'encadrement de leurs betails Prise cdes mesures disciplinaires a l'egard des bergers refractaires Creation d'un comite mixte mettant ensemble Agricultuer et eleveux sous la difrecyte coordination d'une autorite IOocale independante et neutre 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Eleveurs et agriculteurs Chefs traditionnel Chefs des communaute Autorites locales chargees de l'elevage et de l'agriculture
	Insuffisance des points d'eau		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Amenagement des sources naturelles existants Creation des nouveau point d'eau Considerer la repartition de la population dans la creation des points d'eau Mettre en place des comites de gestion des points d'eau et renforcer leur capacite a la sensibilisation au conflit 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> HCR et autres ONG partenaires Population hote et population refugiee L'Etat
	La consommation des substances illicites (drogues telles le Tramol)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Recours aux agents de forces de l'ordre Introduction des programmes de sensibilisation sur les mefaits de l'acolisme et de la drogue sur l'organisme et sur la societe 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Control rigoureux de l'activite commercial pou evoiter la vente de tramol Renforcer le niveau de scolarisation des enfants Créer des plateformes et des structures pour la sensibilisation, l'education et le suivi des jeunes non scolarise et deseouvres Programme de rehabilitations des jeunes adonnes a la drogue 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> L'Etat (MINSANTE, MINAS, MINCOMMERCE) ONGs Enseignants Chefs traditionnels Leaders religieux Leaders d'associations des jeunes Les parents
Insuffisance du personnel enseignant	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Recrutement des maitres de parents(Salaire par l'APEE) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Affectation des enseignants titulaires dans les ecoles Titularisation des maitres de parents Appuyer l'APEE pour mieux payer les maitres de parents Sensibiliser les parents d'eleves au payement des frais d'APEE 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> L'Etat(MINEDUB) UNICEF et ses partenaires L'APEE 	

Site/Village	Problèmes Clés	Options de Réponse déjà sur place	Options de Réponses (suggérer par les interviewés, ou par l'équipes)	Acteurs de Réponse
GUIWA YANGAMO	Non scolarisation des enfants	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Construction des établissements scolaires La gratuite de l'éducation primaire au Cameroun Personnel enseignants présents 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sensibilisation des parents sur l'importance d'envoyer leurs enfants à l'école Renforcer les mesures interdisant le travail des mineurs Introduire des bourses de mérite dans les écoles 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> L'Etat(MINEDUB) UNICEF et ses partenaires L'APEE
	Stigmatisation des réfugiés	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Promotion de la cohésion sociale Mise en place de la commission locale Justice et Paix 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Renforcement des activités de cohésion sociale(Sport, activités culturelles, projets communautaire) Evaluation régulière du niveau de cohésion sociale Etablissement d'un cadre formel de dialogue interreligieux et interethnique Creation d'une radio communautaire 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> L'Etat HCR et partenaires Leaders traditionnels et religieux Enseignants Parents CEMAC UA
	Dégradation des cases habitées par les réfugiés	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Aucune 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Encourager les réfugiés à être autonomes Promouvoir des activités génératrice de revenu Eduquer les réfugiés à l'entretien de leur environnement 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Les réfugiés HCR et partenaires Leaders traditionnels et religieux L'autorité administrative locale
	Insuffisance des terres agraires	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Location des terres aux réfugiés sous condition(Ne pas planter les arbres fruitier) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Faciliter l'accès aux terres en éliminant les frais de location Creation des comités mixtes réfugiés population hôte pour discuter des questions liées à la terre Mise à la disposition des agriculteurs des engrais pour augmenter la productivité des terres 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Chefs traditionnels Autorités administratives(Maires, Sous-prefets) Populations locales Population de réfugiés
MANDJOU	Insécurité: cas de vols, agressions, meurtres (Voir BOULEMBE)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mise en place des patrouilles mixtes Perquisition régulière des maisons par les forces de l'ordre 		
	Conflits agro-pastoraux (voir BOULEMBE)			
	Insuffisance des points d'eau (Voir BOULEMBE)			

Site/Village	Problèmes Clés	Options de Réponse déjà sur place	Options de Réponses (suggérer par les interviewés, ou par l'équipes)	Acteurs de Réponse
MANDJOU	Manque d'infrastructures scolaires	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Construction de nouveaux bâtiments pour l'école Equipements des salles de classe améliorées 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reaménager le point d'eau de l'école Constuire des points d'eau dans les nouvelles écoles créées Augmenter les salles de classe Aider les enfants réfugiés à avoir les fournitures scolaires Sensibiliser les acteurs du système éducatif à l'entretien des espaces scolaires 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> L'Etat (MINEDUB) UNICEF et ses partenaires L'APEE
	Problème de déclaration de naissance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sensibilisation des communautés réfugiés à la nécessité de déclarer les naissances Etablissement des actes de naissance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Renforcer la sensibilisation Faire des partenariats avec des hôpitaux pour la déclaration des naissances 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> HCR et partenaires Leaders communautaires Association des femmes Chef de centre de santé
	Conflit de leadership	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Plusieurs médiations faites par l'autorité administratives Mise sur place d'un comité multipartite de gestion des réfugiés avec à la tête le Harido 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Renforcement des activités de cohésion sociale (Sport, activités culturelles, projets communautaire) Evaluation régulière du niveau de cohésion sociale Etablissement d'un cadre formel de dialogue interreligieux et interethnique Creation d'une radio communautaire 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> L'Etat HCR et partenaires Leaders traditionnels et religieux
	Envahissement des terres		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Etablir un dialogue avec le chef local Mettre sur pied une plateforme de rencontre entre les leaders communautaire pour traiter les questions liées à la terre 	
	Problèmes de chômage			

c. Garoua-Boulai

SCA - Matrix de « Brainstorming » des Options de Réponse

Site/Village	Problèmes Clés	Options de Réponse déjà sur place	Options de Réponses (suggérer par les interviewés, ou par l'équipe.)	Acteurs de Réponse	
GADO-BADZERE	Accès limité à l'eau et à la santé	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Existence de quelque point d'eau construit dans le site et dans le village par des ONG Existence de quelques centres de santé primaire 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Augmenter les points d'eau dans le site (2 dans le village et 3 dans le site) Agrandir et Equiper le centre de santé de matériel permettant la prise en charge d'un nombre plus important, et d'une variété de cas plus sérieux Prise en charge des frais de scolarité des réfugiés élèves du secondaire et étudiant du supérieur, Offrir des bourses d'études dans des universités Camerounaises 	CRS, Etat, UNHCR, Autres ONG et aussi les comités mixtes de gestion pour l'entretien CRS, Croix Rouge, AHA, MINSANTE, OMS	
	Accès limité à l'éducation, surtout secondaire et supérieur	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Présence d'un CES, et aussi octroie de la bourse DAFI aux réfugiés 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Financer des activités commerciales, et de constructions (menuiserie, maçonneries) d'élevage et d'agriculture. Mais bien après étude du marché, de faisabilité et de formation professionnelle préalable des bénéficiaires (réfugiés et locaux) 	UNESCO, UNICEF, MINESEC, MINESUP	
	Absence d'AGR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Formation aux métiers de l'art plastique par ONUFEMMES et IEDA (interrompu pour des problèmes de financement 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sensibiliser les deux groupes confessionnels sur les thématiques de l' cumulisme à travers des ateliers Construction dans le site d'une chapelle pour réfugiés chrétiens 	CRS, ONUFEMMES, IEDA, MINAS, MINPROF, Autres partenaires	
	Discrimination confessionnelle entre musulman et Chrétien	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Collaboration entre l'IMAM Malik et le Curé de la paroisse de la localité Association mixtes des femmes (musulmanes et chrétienne) Création du comité des Bâtisseurs de Paix 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Créer un Centre de prise en charge psychiatrique à Bertoua pour couvrir les cas de la zone de l'EST, qui actuellement sont référés exclusivement à Yaoundé ou Douala 	CDJP, UNHCR, Bâtisseurs de Paix, CRS	
	Consommation abusive de drogue	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sensibilisations sur les dangers des drogues par L'ONG CARE en matière de santé mentale 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Transférer la compétence et d'identification et d'attribution du statut de réfugié de l'UNHCR à L'Etat Camerounais, pour un meilleur suivi 	MINSANTE, OMS, CRS, CARE	
	Falsification des documents	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Aucune réponse 			UNHCR, Services d'Emi/ imigration, Police, Gendarmerie

GAROUA-BOULAI	Grand banditisme	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Création d'un commissariat de sécurité publique Création des comités de vigilance Présence du BIM (Bataillon d'infanterie Motorisé) Présence du BIR (bataillon d'intervention rapide) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Former et équiper les comités de vigilance avec des torches, des teasers, et des matraques 	MINDEF, ONG, et autres partenaires
	Pratique du sexe de survie		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Formation professionnelle des jeunes filles autochtones et réfugiés, dans les métiers de coiffure, commerce, hôtellerie, restauration, la couture Financer et suivre leurs activités d'entreprenariat Sensibiliser sur le risque de maladie sexuellement transmissible 	ONU-FEMME, MINTOURISME, MINPROF, MINEFOP, MINSANTE, autres partenaires
	Enregistrement des réfugiés	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Voir « falsification des documents plus haut » 	idem	idem
	Disputes autour des points d'eau	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Voir « Accès limité à l'eau, plus haut » 	idem	idem
BETARE-OYA	Difficulté d'intégration avec la population locale	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mise d'un comité mixte de cohésion sociale (25 réfugiés et 25 autochtones), mais plus dissolution par manque de soutien Association des réfugiés dynamiques, pour l'intégration entre eux réfugiés 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Remettre sur pied et soutenir financièrement et par des formations, le comité mixte de cohésion sociale (réfugiés et autochtones) 	CRS, UNHCR, ONU-FEMMES et autres partenaires
	Insécurité/grand banditisme	Voir plus haut	idem	idem
	Accès limité aux ressources (eau, terre cultivable)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Présence de quelque point d'eau très souvent défectueux 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> construire des points d'eau (O4) rechercher et acquérir des espaces cultivables 	IEDA, CRS, UNHCR, Chefferie locale, Sous-préfecture, MINAGRI et autres partenaires
	Conflit de ressources (eau, bois)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> présence de trois forages, dont un est en panne et inutilisable Absence de réponse concernant le conflit de ressource en matière de bois Création d'un chef de poste Agricole pour veiller à empêcher les bêtes de venir dans les champs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Construire de trois points d'eau supplémentaire Sensibiliser les populations sur le danger de l'exploitation non contrôlée des ressources en matière de bois et du risque de déforestation Initier les populations locales et réfugiés, aux techniques de reboisement Création des zones propres aux pâturages entourées de fils barbelés et des piquets afin d'y confiner les bétails 	MINAGRI, MINFOP, CRS, Chefferie, Sous-Préfecture
GARGA-SARALI	Conflit de ressources (eau, bois)			
	Conflit Agro-pastoraux-			

<p>TRANSFRONTALIERS (Garoua-Boulai/RCA)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Infiltrations des groupes armées pour mener des attaques • Utilisations de la frontière comme moyen de fuite pour les criminels (voleur de moto et de marchandises) • Mauvais contrôle du flux migratoire (personnes, biens, Traffic de tout genre) et porosité de la frontière 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Présence des militaires (BIR, BIM, Police, Gendarmerie, MINUSCA) qui ripostent en cas d'attaques • Négociation entre le président du syndicat des motos taximan et les malfrats pour la récupération des biens (surtout les motos) volées • Présence de la douane et de la police des frontières 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Multiplier les unités de surveillance des barrières frontalières • Perquisition inopinée dans les camps de réfugiés, où se trouvent parfois des caches d'armes (plusieurs réseaux démantelés par le BIR à GADO) • Pourparlers de sécurité et paix entre les deux ETATS (CAMEROUN/RCA), par les gouvernants • Inspection plus rigoureuse des personnes, des véhicules et des biens entrant et sortant. • lutte contre la corruption des autorités administratives et militaires transfrontalières, aussi bien en RCA qu'au Cameroun 	<p>MINDEF, CONAC, UNHCR, MINUSCA,</p>
--	---	--	--	---------------------------------------

faith. action. results.

Catholic Relief Services, 228 West Lexington Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21201-3443

www.crs.org

